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ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
"If you spoke as she did, sir, instead of the way you do, why you
might be selling flowers, too."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1995, the en banc Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
Flores v. State2 upheld a lower court's ruling that gave a drunk-driving
(DWI) offender, Aristeo Lira Flores, a one-year term of imprisonment
rather than a one-year term of probation.3 The trial judge denied proba-
tion not because of the offender's character or the seriousness of the of-
fense, but because Mr. Flores could not speak English.4 The county in
which Mr. Flores was arrested and convicted did not provide a DWI reha-
bilitation program in Spanish. Therefore, the judge reasoned that Mr.
Flores could not benefit from probation.5
In his appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Flores
claimed that the lower court violated his equal protection and due pro-
cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution,6 and his equality rights and due course of law rights under the
1. My FAIR LADY (20th Century Fox 1964).
2. 904 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716
(1996).
3. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131.
4. Id. at 130. Mr. Flores previously had been convicted of the same offense and
placed on probation, but the trial judge did not cite this prior conviction or any other factor
in defending his decision. Id. at 133 (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 130. The trial judge stated, "'I'm not going to put you on probation. To put
someone on probation, I have to feel that they can be rehabilitated, and there are no
provisions in this county to help Spanish speaking people who are convicted of alcohol
offenses."' Id. at 133 (Overstreet, J., dissenting). According to the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, judges who grant probation to convicted drunk-driving defendants must order
that the individuals attend and successfully complete "an educational program jointly ap-
proved by the Texas Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, the Department of Public
Safety, the Traffic Safety Section of the Texas Department of Transportation, and the com-
munity justice assistance division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice." TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 13(h) (Vernon Supp. 1996). Judges may waive this
requirement or grant a time extension on a showing by the defendants of good cause. Id.
To determine whether good cause exists, judges may consider: (1) "the defendant's school
and work schedule"; (2) "the defendant's health"; (3) "the distance the defendant must
travel to attend an educational program"; and (4) whether or not the defendant has trans-
portation. Id. Judges make their decision based on what they believe to be in the best
interest of justice, the public, and the defendant. Id. art. 42.12 § 3(a).
6. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Texas Constitution.7 Had the judge denied Mr. Flores, a Latino, proba-
tion because of his race, Mr. Flores almost certainly would have been
successful on his federal claims,' because the very notion of equal protec-
tion is intrinsically connected with race.9 Likewise, Mr. Flores probably
would have prevailed on his due process claim had he been able to estab-
lish that he had a fundamental right to probation or to be a monolingual
7. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130. Texas's version of equal protection provides, in part, that
"[aIll free men ... have equal rights." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3. Texas's due course of law
provision states that "[n]o citizen of this state shall be deprived of life, liberty, property,
privileges, or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the
law of the land." Id. § 19. In addition, Mr. Flores claimed that the Texas Equal Rights
Amendment offered protections beyond those provided anywhere in the federal or Texas
constitutions and was broad enough to protect Texas citizens from classifications made on
the basis of language ability. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a
(providing that "[e]quality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex,
race, color, creed, or national origin").
8. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (stating that "[t]here is no question that discrimina-
tion based on race or national origin is prohibited by the due process, due course of law,
equal protection, and equal rights clauses of the United States and Texas constitutions");
id. at 131-32 (Myers, J., concurring) (asserting that conviction would be overturned if rec-
ord had indicated that judge's sentence was intended to discriminate on basis of race).
9. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (stating that main purpose of
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is to prevent racial discrimination);
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The
Original Understanding (stating that preventing discrimination against former slaves was
chief aim of Fourteenth Amendment), in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL
OF RIGHrS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY 85, 101-02 (Charles Fairman & Stanley Morri-
son eds., 1970); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1061 (1978) (maintaining that overwhelming goal of Civil War amendments was to estab-
lish and protect freedoms of newly-freed slaves); Johnny Parker, When Johnny Came
Marching Home Again: A Critical Review of Contemporary Equal Protection Interpreta-
tion, 37 How. L.J. 393, 394 (1994) (acknowledging that principal object of Fourteenth
Amendment was to create equality between African-Americans and Caucasians); see also
Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Separating Prejudice from Rationality in Equal Protection Cases: A
Legacy of Thurgood Marshall, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 94 (1994) (indicating that because
preventing racial discrimination was primary reason for Fourteenth Amendment, Supreme
Court evaluates laws promoting racial bigotry with closer scrutiny). How strictly the early
Court reviewed race discrimination is debated. Compare Michael Klarman, An Interpreta-
tive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 227 (1991) (arguing that,
before 1960s, Supreme Court failed to read Fourteenth Amendment as presumptively
striking racial classifications), with Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifica-
tions: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 940 (1991) (not-
ing that early Supreme Court decisions dealing with equal protection issues acknowledged
equal protection rights for all races). Also unclear is just how protected the amendment's
authors intended African-Americans to be. See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 290 (1984) (noting that 1868 Republican platform man-
dated African-American suffrage only in southern states but left decision to rest of states).
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speaker of a language other than English.' ° Mr. Flores's state claims
would have been equally successful, because Texas courts have tradition-
ally interpreted and applied their equal protection and due course of law
provisions by the same standards as those used for the federal
provisions."
Mr. Flores, however, invited the court to resolve current federal and
state confusion over the issue of language and find constitutional protec-
tion for individuals who are unable to speak English.' 2 The court de-
clined the invitation.' 3 Instead, a plurality of the court formalistically
applied the rigid classification scheme for assessing equal protection
claims and summarily dismissed Mr. Flores's claim that a due process fun-
damental right was at issue,' 4 thus denying him any remedy for the al-
leged violations of his constitutional rights.
10. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130-31 (noting that since Mr. Flores's claim implicated
no fundamental right, heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis was not appro-
priate). State action rarely survives strict scrutiny. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact"); Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection
Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 485
(1994) (calling government's burden under strict scrutiny "for all practical purposes, insur-
mountable"). But cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101 (1995)
(disputing strict-in-theory, fatal-in-fact truism for race-remedy cases); Klutznick v. Fulli-
love, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that strict-in-theory, fatal-
in-fact scrutiny should not be applied to race remedial measures).
11. See Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist., 979 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992) (not-
ing that Texas equal protection principles "echo" federal principles and have same require-
ments); In re R.L.H., 771 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied) (stating
federal precedent is "persuasive" interpretation of state constitution's equal protection and
due process provisions); Twiford v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 325, 328 n.5
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting Texas and United States equal
protection tests have same requirements). But cf Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating Texas constitution is not dependent on federal constitution
for purposes of search and seizure protections); Collier v. Fireman's & Policeman's Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 817 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied) (noting
that Texas Supreme Court has occasionally found equal protection rights to be broader
under state constitution than federal constitution); Josd Roberto Judrez, Jr., The American
Tradition of Language Rights: The Forgotten Right of Government in a "Known Tongue,"
13 LAW & INEO. J. 443, 626 (1995) (contending that Texas Equal Rights Amendment pro-
vides broader protection than federal constitution).
12. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (stating Mr. Flores's claim that discrimination on
basis of language violates equal protection, due process, due course of law, and equal
rights).
13. See id. (holding that because language is not equal to race, language discrimina-
tion is not subject to strict scrutiny under Fourteenth Amendment).
14. See id. (finding no suspect classification or fundamental right at stake in Mr. Flo-
res's claim).
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The Flores decision coincided with a renewed and sometimes bitter na-
tional debate concerning the rights and privileges that language minori-
ties may claim from their government and the extent to which the
government may regulate the use of languages other than English."5
Seven proposals are pending in Congress for either a law or a constitu-
tional amendment that would make English the nation's official lan-
guage. 6 In addition, twenty-two states have declared English to be their
15. See Miguel Bustillo, City Criticized for Printing Notices in Spanish Paper, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at B1 (describing citizen complaints that arose when municipality
awarded contract to publish legal notices to low-bidding Spanish-language newspaper);
English Can Take Care of Itself, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1996, at B12 (arguing
that official English-language proposal in Missouri is wrong way to encourage immigrants
to learn English); Curtis Lawrence, Making English Official Language Could Be Divisive:
Officials Lament Plan That Would End Federal Funds for Bilingual Programs, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Nov. 27, 1995, at 3 (noting concern in Milwaukee that official English propos-
als will divide nation's ethnic groups from whites); David J. Willis, Time We Draw the Line
About Speaking English, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1995, at A39 (stating that if nation can-
not preserve its culture by defending its language, then it is not really nation). Two months
after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued the Flores decision, another Texas jurist, Judge
Samuel Kiser of Amarillo, ordered a mother engaged in a custody dispute to start speaking
English to her five-year-old daughter or risk losing custody. Diane Jennings, Judge Orders
Amarillo Mother to Speak English to Daughter: Not Doing So Is Abusing Child, He Rules
in Custody Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 1995, at Al. The judge told the
mother, "If she [the child] starts first grade with other children and cannot even speak the
language that the teachers and the other children speak, and she's a full-blood American
citizen, you're abusing that child." Id. The child's mother, a bilingual office clerk, said she
spoke Spanish at home to encourage her children to be bilingual. Id. This goal, however,
did not impress Judge Kiser, who told Ms. Laureno that he could terminate her custody
rights because "it's not in [the child's] best interest to be ignorant." Id. Judge Kiser later
rescinded this order. Patty Reinert, Amarillo Judge Does About-Face: Girl's Parents Re-
solve Language Dispute, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 19, 1995, at 11. The unconstitutionality of
this order is somewhat more apparent than that of the denial of Mr. Flores's probation,
because this order interferes with family decision-making. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (suggesting that right of parents to engage teacher to teach their chil-
dren foreign language is protected under Fourteenth Amendment). Judge Kiser's state-
ments aroused a nationwide controversy. See, e.g., Linda Chavez, Schools Must Scrutinize
Bilingual Programs, DENV. POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at B-07 (arguing that Judge Kiser was
correct in concern for child, but wrong to interfere in parenting decision); Sara Gonzalez,
Editorial, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 18, 1995, at A7 (stating, "I would rather be a house-
keeper than call myself a judge and behave like a fool."); James Harrington, Racism Taints
Texas Justice, DAILY TEXAN, Sept. 7, 1995, at 5 (criticizing Laureno and Flores decisions);
Language As a Barrier, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 12, 1995, at A12 (opining, "Somebody
should explain the law to the judge and do so in plain English."); Myriam Marquez, Span-
ish Relegates Child to Housemaid's Future? No Way, Jose, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 8,
1995, at A16 (stating, "The U.S. Constitution grants us freedom of speech, but must it be in
English?").
16. See S. 356, 104th Cong. (1995) (declaring English official language of United
States and providing that no person shall be denied government services "solely because
the person communicates in English"); S. 175, 104th Cong. (1995) (amending United States
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official language.' 7 The legal effects of these measures and proposals are
Code to declare English official language of United States); H.R.J. Res. 109, 104th Cong.
(1995) (proposing English as official language); H.R. 123, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing
that English will be official language for government business); H.R. 345, 104th Cong.
(1995) (making English official language and calling for naturalization proceedings to be
conducted solely in English); H.R. 739, 104th Cong. (1995) (calling English "preferred lan-
guage of communication" and stipulating that all naturalization ceremonies will be con-
ducted in English); H.R. 1005, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing end to all bilingual education
programs). In addition, both the House and Senate proposals for the 1996 budget include
provisions forbidding sanctions against any state that declares English as its official lan-
guage. S. 1594, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3019, 104th Cong. (1996). But cf. H.R. Con. Res.
83, 104th Cong. (1995) (noting value of multilingualism and rejecting "English-only" meas-
ures as "unwarranted Federal regulation of self-expression and equal protection of the
laws"). In 1995, presidential candidates Senator Robert Dole, Senator Richard Lugar, and
Patrick Buchanan all endorsed federal legislation or a constitutional amendment enshrin-
ing English as the nation's language. Mike Doming & Melita M. Garza, English Language
Gains New Meaning in National Politics, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1995, at 1. President Bill
Clinton spoke out against English-only proposals. See Adrianne Flynn & Jeff Barker, Clin-
ton Opposed to GOP-Backed English Only Bill, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1995, at A17
(reporting Clinton's speech before Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute, in which he
opposed English-only legislation). However, as governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton signed
an official-English measure into law. The English-Only Debate: Where the Candidates
Stand, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 1995, at llA.
17. ALA. CONST. amend. 509; ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4 (making
both English and Hawaiian state's official languages); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27; ARK. CODE
ANN. § 1-4-117 (Michie 1996); 1986 Ga. Laws 529 (see also 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. 95-16
(1995) (rendering unofficial opinion that 1986 Ga. Laws 529 has force of law)); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 5, para. 460/20 (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (Burns 1995);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31
(1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510 (1995); 1995 N.H. Laws 157; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 145-12 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-20 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 4-1-404 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1993). In 1992, Louisiana's assis-
tant attorney general, Kay Kilpatrick, stated in a letter to U.S. ENGLISH, that "English is
the only official language of Louisiana." Update on Legal Official Recognition in Missour4
Louisiana, U.S. Newswire, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.
Louisiana's constitution, however, protects the right to "preserve, foster and promote"
one's historic linguistic and cultural origins. LA. CONST., art. 12, § 4. In contrast, Puerto
Rico enacted legislation making Spanish its official language. 1991 P.R. Laws 4. The stat-
ute allows the government to use other languages when "convenient, necessary or indis-
pensable." Id. § 3. Oregon has explicitly denounced the idea of English-only legislation.
See Michele Arington, Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the
States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 326 n.8 (1991) (summarizing sta-
tus of English-only laws). An unsuccessful attempt to enact an official English measure
was launched in Texas in 1987. See Frank M. Lowrey IV, Comment, Through the Looking
Glass: Linguistic Separatism and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223, 287 (1992) (tracing
history of statutes recognizing English as official language). However, in November 1995,
a poll indicated some support among Texas voters for English-only legislation. See Maria
F. Durand, Poll Shows Most Texans Favor a Law Like Prop 187: Residents Are Divided on
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unclear."8 Equally unclear is what protections federal and state courts
Immigration, Language Issues, SAN AroNio EXPREsS-NEWS, Nov. 4, 1995, at 1A (report-
ing results of Texas poll on immigration issues). The poll indicated 44% of Texans favored
English-only legislation. Id. A 1996 poll, conducted by the Southwest Voter Research
Institute, indicated that 56% of Latino voters in Texas oppose official-language legislation.
Telephone Interview with Angela Acosta, Research Coordinator, Southwest Voter Re-
search Institute, Inc. (Sept. 12, 1996). However, 90% of Texas Hispanic voters opposed
specific measures as English-only ballots or state services provided in only English. Id.
18. See, e.g., Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality
of Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690, 692 (1995) (argu-
ing effect of English-only amendments is to "render language minorities powerless"); Jo-
seph Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 519, 547 (1985) (contending that broadest proposals could conceivably
reverse Meyer v. Nebraska, which held that Fourteenth Amendment protected right to
teach foreign language or to request that children be taught foreign language); Mike Dorn-
ing & Melita M. Garza, English Language Gains New Meaning in National Politics, CHi.
TRIB., Sept. 19, 1995, at 1 (noting that New Hampshire's English-only measure does not
regulate private commercial activity and does not address legality of bilingual education or
ballots, although state currently provides neither); Steven Thomma & Angie Cannon, Lan-
guage Wars Tap Insecurity; Battle over English Has Historical Basis for Americans, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 10, 1995, at 2 (quoting Rep. Toby Roth, who argues that his proposal pend-
ing in Congress would abolish all federal mandates and funding for bilingual education and
would require all forms, including ballots, to be printed in English only). But see Michele
Arington, Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the States over
Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 328 (1991) (arguing that Supremacy Clause
of United States Constitution, which makes constitutional principles and federal laws ac-
commodating language superior to state measures, implies that states' English-only legisla-
tion can have little force); Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail
Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1345, 1346-47 (1987) (arguing that state
declaration of English as official language will, by itself, have little legal effect but could be
used by opponents to eradicate bilingual programs). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has already invalidated Arizona's English-only constitutional amend-
ment, which made English the state's official language and required that English be used
exclusively in all government transactions. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69
F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996). The court distinguished
between cases involving the issue of whether the state had an affirmative duty to provide
services or information in other languages and cases where the state prohibited use of a
foreign language. Id. at 936-37. The court relied on the First Amendment to hold that
prohibiting language is a denial of constitutional rights. Id. at 949; cf. Conner v. Sakai, 15
F.3d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding prison English-only rule as applied to right to pray
violated due process clause), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct.
2293 (1995).
However, many English-only provisions also address, less directly, the problem
presented by the Flores decision: is there a duty to provide benefits, particularly in the
criminal justice system, in other languages or, at least, a duty not to allow language to be a
consideration for the conferring of benefits? This question was raised anew by the April 1,
1996, beating of two Mexican immigrants by two white police deputies in Riverside
County, California. Kenneth B. Noble, English Commands Preceded Deputies' Beatings of
Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A12. According to an audiotape of the incident,
the officers, who had received some Spanish training, commanded the immigrants in Eng-
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can offer language minorities. Decisions striking or upholding state ac-
tion against the use of languages other than English have relied, for the
most part, on various statutes governing the treatment of non-English
speakers. 19 Yet even those statutes, written to protect language minori-
ties, have offered unreliable protections and may not be sufficient to pro-
tect individuals from the language-based discrimination endorsed by
these measures and proposed laws.2°
lish to get down on the ground. Id. When the immigrants, who reportedly did not know
English, failed to respond, the officers beat them. Id. Only after beginning the beating did
the officers speak to the suspects in Spanish. Id. The American Civil Liberties Union,
representing one of the Mexicans, has alleged that the officers' orders were unintelligible.
Id. Such incidents demand a consideration of the duties that a state owes its monolingual
language minorities. This issue is the focus of this Comment.
19. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (holding that failure to provide Eng-
lish language instruction to Chinese students violates Title VI, § 601 of Civil Rights Act of
1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) (stating that, under Voting Rights
Act, English literacy requirement cannot be used against non-English speakers who have
better than sixth grade educations); United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir.
1990) (acknowledging that Federal Court Interpreters Act protects rights of language-mi-
nority defendants), cert. denied sub nom. Panchal v. United States, 498 U.S. 986 (1990).
The United States has never formulated an official language policy, but rather developed a
patchwork of cases and legislation providing inconsistent protection for language minori-
ties. See NANCY F. CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LAN-
GUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 235 (1983) (attributing lack of official
language policy to American desire for privacy and self-determination); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-la (1994) (requiring that states with significant number of bilingual voters pro-
vide bilingual ballots); 20 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7491 (1994) (declaring efforts in schools to teach
language-minority children English language to be United States policy); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally
funded programs); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (a)-(c) (1996) (providing limits and guidelines for
restrictions on foreign-language use in workplace). In addition, the use of foreign lan-
guages is mandated in at least two instances: in migrant and community health centers and
in alcohol abuse and treatment centers, where there are a substantial number of non-Eng-
lish speakers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 254b(a)(1)(G) & 254c(e)(3)(J) (1994) (requiring that mi-
grant health centers provide interpreters); 42 U.S.C. § 4577(b) (1994) (mandating, to
extent practicable, use of interpreters for alcohol rehabilitation programs). Because legis-
lation and its interpretation is inconsistent and could be reversed by English-only laws, this
Comment focuses on the protective potential of the Fourteenth Amendment. That the
Fourteenth Amendment should protect language minorities seems a matter of common
sense, but this assertion is not so obvious to the courts. See Frank M. Lowrey IV, Com-
ment, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism and National Unity, 41 EMORY
L.J. 223, 298-99 (1992) (asserting that barriers to government services based on language
may be unconstitutional, but predicting that courts will narrowly construe English declara-
tions so as to maintain constitutionality).
20. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that, because workplace English-only rule had no adverse effect on bilingual workers, it
was permissible under Title VII, in spite of EEOC guidelines which state that employer
must show business justification for such policy), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994); Garcia
v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that English-only rule at workplace is
[Vol. 28:149
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Additionally, surprisingly few court decisions have rested on the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process2' and Equal Protection22 Clauses, and
even these decisions have failed to clarify the underlying issues.23 How-
ever, because statutes have provided unreliable sources of protection in
an area where constitutional rights are at least suggested, 24 courts must
turn to the Fourteenth Amendment or corresponding state measures for
ultimate authority on what actions the government may take with regard
to language minorities. The Flores case powerfully illustrates the central
issues of this debate, asking at once whether a state actor may, on a show-
ing of a rational basis, discriminate against a non-English-speaking crimi-
nal offender and whether a state has some affirmative duty to
accommodate that individual.25
not discriminatory when person who can speak English chooses not to and neither goal nor
effect of rule is discriminatory), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1984); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v.
Tempe Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Title VI
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974 require no more
than state-provided remedial English instruction); Vialez v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
783 F. Supp. 109, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not require government to offer multilingual notices to meet demands of procedural
due process). It is important to note that EEOC guidelines are non-binding, and courts
"will not defer to 'an administrative construction of a statute where there are compelling
indications that it is wrong."' Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1489 (quoting Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973)).
21. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (upholding parents' rights to
send children to private Japanese-language schools); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S.
500, 524-25 (1926) (protecting rights of Chinese business persons in Philippines to pursue
occupations); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (identifying fundamental right of language teach-
ers to choose their employment).
22. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363-64 (1991) (suggesting possibility of
equal protection for language minorities if race/language nexus shown); Olagues v. Rus-
soniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (analyzing voter registration fraud investiga-
tion targeting Spanish- and Chinese-speaking individuals under equal protection), vacated
as moot, 484 U.S. 906 (1987); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that English notice of Social Security benefits denial does not violate equal pro-
tection), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th
Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to provide civil service examinations in taker's native lan-
guage does not violate equal protection).
23. See Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of
Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3 (1992) (noting poor handling of language differences by
courts); Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous.
L. REv. 885, 890, 893 (1986) (calling case law dealing with language rights "confusing" and
"contradicting"); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Eth-
nic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761, 803 n.124 (asserting that case law
evaluating equal protection claims of language discrimination has resulted in inconsistent
and inadequate results).
24. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
25. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131 (holding that, because language does not form basis
for suspect classification and there is no fundamental right to probation, court may deter-
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This Comment, relying on the Flores decision as a model for constitu-
tional analysis of a language minority's claim, will address these questions
and the courts' reluctance to provide satisfactory and consistent answers
to them. Part II will briefly discuss America's history with language mi-
norities and the issues they have raised in American law. Part III will
address the classifications aspect of equal protection analysis and ex-
amine the difficulties of fitting language into the current suspect classifi-
cation formulation. Part IV will discuss fundamental rights under the
Due Process Clause, particularly with an eye toward the rights implicated
in the Flores decision. Part V will discuss the Flores decision. Finally,
Part VI will argue that claims alleging language discrimination deserve a
higher level of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. LANGUAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
A. Diversity v. Unification: The Beginnings of Dispute
The current national debate over language rights is not a new contro-
versy.26 In the country's early history, immigrants maintained closely-
knit settlements and preserved their native languages, often educating
their children, printing their newspapers, and conducting their businesses
in their native tongues.27 In addition to Native American speakers, com-
mine sentence on basis of language). The Flores court further stated that a county is not
obligated to provide foreign-language alcohol and drug programs to Latinos. See id. (con-
tending that acceptance of Mr. Flores's argument would mean state government would be
required to set up alcohol education programs in many different languages).
26. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
FOR AMERICANS? 42 (1990) (noting that after Revolutionary War, debate arose over
whether new nation's "official language" should be English, Hebrew, Greek, or French);
Arnold H. Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NORE
DAME L. REV. 7, 20 (1970) (observing that Congress has generally imposed some English
language mandate on territory prior to approving its admission to Union); Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Of-
ficial English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 303-50 (1992) (discussing language controversies,
from appeals for German translations of federal legislation in 18th century through Eng-
lish-only movements of mid- and late 20th century). Language diversity, however, did not
always incite controversy in the country's early history. See Shirley B. Heath, English in
Our Language Heritage (citing 1870 U.S. Commission of Education report, which claimed
German had become second language of United States and further recognized value of
knowing multiple languages in education arena), in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 3, 13 (Charles
A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981); Jurij Fedynskyj, State Session Laws in Non-
English Languages: A Chapter of American Legal History, 46 IND. L.J. 463, 474 (1971)
(noting that between 1774 and 1779, Continental Congress ordered German translations of
selected congressional proceedings five times, as well as German translation of Articles of
Confederation).
27. Shirley B. Heath, English in Our Language Heritage, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA
6, 7 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981); see NANCY F. CONKLIN & MAR-
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munities of German, Spanish, French, Russian, Swedish, and Dutch
speakers thrived in eighteenth and nineteenth century America.28 How-
ever, language maintenance efforts often met with resistance from the
English-speaking majority.29 In 1751, for example, as German settlers in
Pennsylvania pressed for bilingual education, German translation of laws,
and court interpreters, Benjamin Franklin expressed his fear of the en-
croachment of the German language in Pennsylvania.3" Also, states com-
ing into the Union with large, language-minority populations sometimes
saw a need to institutionalize English.3 For example, Louisiana's first
GARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 226 (1983) (observing that in its first hundred years, United States was multil-
ingual); Shirley B. Heath, Why No Official Tongue? (noting that multiple languages played
wide variety of roles in country's early history), in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE
BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 20, 21-22 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
28. JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 22-23 (1978).
29. See id. at 9-10 (noting English speakers' fear that German would overtake English
as national language). But see Dennis Baron, Federal English, (stating that, in spite of
language competition in rest of New World, early United States policy was at least offi-
cially tolerant), in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH
CONTROVERSY 36, 37 (James Crawford ed., 1992); Shirley B. Heath, Why No Official
Tongue? (asserting that use of languages other than English was widely accepted and en-
couraged in early United States), in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE
OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 20, 22 (James Crawford ed., 1992). Language conver-
sion was a chief goal among policy-makers dealing with Native Americans. See J.D.C.
Atkins, "Barbarous Dialects Should Be Blotted Out..." (arguing that Native Americans
must give up indigenous languages to be assimilated into American culture), reprinted in
LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 47,
48-49 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
30. See Benjamin Franklin, The German Language in Pennsylvania (stating, "[tlhey
[the Germans] begin of late to make all their Bonds and other legal Writings in their own
Language, which (though I think it ought not to be) are allowed in our Courts"), reprinted
in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY
18, 18-19 (James Crawford ed., 1992); see also Shirley B. Heath, English in Our Language
Heritage (explaining that Franklin's attack on German language probably reflected his re-
sentment of German dominance in local Pennsylvania politics), in LANGUAGE IN THE USA
6, 9-10 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981); Juan F. Perea, Demography
and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English,
77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 287-89 (1992) (discussing Franklin's views on German settlers and
their language); cf Heinz Kloss, German-American Language Maintenance Efforts
(describing large German settlement in Pennsylvania and other states in 18th century), in
LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 206, 215 (Joshua A. Fishman ed., 1966).
31. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
FOR AMERICANS? 74-87 (1990) (discussing internal efforts in Pennsylvania and Louisiana
to establish English as dominant language); Arnold H. Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal
Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 7, 20 (1970) (noting that federal
government often conditioned statehood on whether territory had high percentage of Eng-
lish speakers in its population). However, after statehood, new states with a large number
of language minorities often attempted to encourage or allow foreign language use. Ar-
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constitution, adopted in 1812, stated that all laws and judicial and legisla-
tive proceedings must be conducted and preserved exclusively in English,
in spite of the state's large French-speaking minority.32
Increased numbers of immigrants and heightened xenophobia took
hold of the country in the early twentieth century, resulting in more
programmatic discrimination against non-English-speaking people.
33
World War I reinforced the fear of foreigners, especially German foreign-
ers,34 and a large number of states adopted laws restricting the use of
nold H. Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 7, 20 (1970); see Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 309 (1992)
(asserting that some states made efforts to preserve minority language rights or at least to
ensure citizens would not be at legal disadvantage because of language).
32. DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR
AMERICANS? 83 (1990). However, Louisiana quickly moved away from its reluctance to
accommodate French-speaking citizens; the state printed its Constitution in both French
and English, and the 1845 version called for laws to be promulgated in both languages.
Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Plu-
ralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 324 (1992); cf. Arnold H. Leibowitz,
English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 7, 20-21
(1970) (observing present-day inconsistencies in Louisiana law and policy regarding ac-
commodation of French language). California proceeded in precisely the opposite way,
guaranteeing rights to Spanish-speaking citizens at the beginning of statehood, but then
systematically taking them away. NANCY F. CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST
OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 66 (1983).
33. See Shirley B. Heath, English in Our Language Heritage (noting increased xeno-
phobia and resultant state and local laws against language minorities between 1920-1940),
in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 17 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981). Pro-
fessor Heath notes that language often becomes the focus of debate during periods in
which immigrants or other minorities are viewed as threatening. Id. at 10; see also JOSHUA
A. FISHMAN, LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (1978) (noting that mil-
lions of new immigrants came to United States between 1880 and 1920, which was period
of heightened interest in language laws); cf. Theodore Roosevelt, The Children of the Cru-
cible (Sept. 1917) (stating, "[t]he greatness of this nation depends on the swift assimilation
of the aliens she welcomes to her shores. Any force which attempts to retard that assimila-
tive process is a force hostile to the highest interests of our country."), in LANGUAGE LOY-
ALTIES: A SOURCEBOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 84, 85 (James
Crawford ed., 1992).
34. See NANCY F. CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LAN-
GUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1983) (describing anti-German move-
ment taking hold during World War I, resulting in passage of restrictive language laws);
JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1978) (noting that
both World Wars resulted in reduction of German language usage in United States); Shir-
ley B. Heath, English in Our Language Heritage (stating that xenophobia from 1920
through 1940s resulted in discriminatory measures against German, Japanese, and Chinese
speakers), in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 6, 17 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds.,
1981).
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German and other languages, particularly in schools.35 In an attempt to
eradicate German language from American conversation, American pa-
triots replaced 'German fried potatoes' with 'American fries' and 'sauer-
kraut' with 'liberty cabbage.'3 6 At the same time, employers placed
greater demands on their workers for English literacy, increasing the mo-
tivation to learn English.37
B. The Early Supreme Court Cases: Choosing Fundamental Rights
and the Due Process Clause
Against this background of national animosity toward foreigners, the
first case dealing with language rights made its way to the United States
Supreme Court.38 Ultimately resting on a substantive due process analy-
35. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
FOR AMERICANS? 109 (1990) (observing that discrimination against German language in
schools was attempt to force assimilation of German citizens and rid country of subversion
and espionage); William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Per-
spective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 132-33 (1988) (noting 23 states enacted language-restric-
tive statutes during World War I, most aimed particularly at German education); Valerie
A. Lexion, Note, Language Minority Voting Rights and the English Language Amendment,
14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 657, 659-61 (1987) (examining increased xenophobia and nativ-
ism in early part of 20th century that resulted in laws curtailing foreign language use); see
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (invalidating law aimed at keeping Ger-
man language out of Nebraska schools).
36. DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR
AMERICANS? 109 (1990).
37. Shirley B. Heath, English in Our Language Heritage, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA
6, 16 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981). In part, Professor Heath as-
serts, this demand for English literacy stemmed from heightened employer liability for
workplace safety; employers viewed foreign-speaking workers as health and safety risks.
Id. The societal demands for English literacy have not gone away, and the result has been
that an overwhelming majority of citizens speak the language. Joshua A. Fishman, Lan-
guage Policy: Past, Present, Future, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 516,517 (Charles A. Fergu-
son & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981). Several alternate explanations for the
"Americanization" of immigrants are available. See NANCY F. CONKLIN & MARGARET A.
LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 67-70
(1983) (attributing assimilation to increased restrictions on immigration, laws requiring
new citizens to speak English, compulsory education, and American nationalist move-
ments); JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1978)
(identifying attractiveness of American culture, destruction of immigrant traditions by in-
creasingly industrialized society, economic and social rewards for learning English, geo-
graphic mobility, emphasis on children, and "Old-World weariness" as possible
explanations). But see Joseph Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language Amendment:
Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 519, 523 (1985) (noting disincentives to learn-
ing English among Spanish-speakers in United States).
38. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (condoning state's desire to pre-
serve "homogeneous people" as legitimate goal); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish, 69 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 1995) (identifying Meyer as first of early Supreme Court
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sis,39 the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska41 found unconstitutional a Nebraska
law that made it illegal to teach a foreign language in a private or public
primary school.41 In spite of that simple holding, however, Meyer is a
complicated, historically revealing decision. Even while invalidating the
Nebraska law, the Supreme Court reinforced the assumptions and
prejudices behind it, noting that "[u]nfortunate experiences during the
late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent adversa-
ries" made the motivation behind the law understandable.42
On the other hand, the Court hinted that the Constitution may protect
some rights from language-based discrimination: "[T]he individual has
certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of
the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as
well as to those born with English on the tongue. '43 Having made this
broad assertion, however, the Supreme Court proceeded to rest its deci-
sion on a narrower set of rights: the fundamental rights of language
teachers to pursue a chosen occupation and of parents to make educa-
tional decisions concerning their children.'
cases concerning language), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996); see also William G. Ross,
A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 125,
141-64 (1988) (discussing challenges to World War I language statutes in state courts).
39. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. At the time the Court decided Meyer, it had not devel-
oped its two-tiered substantive due process analysis. The language of the decision is simi-
lar to that of minimum scrutiny. See id. at 403 (stating that statute had no "reasonable"
relation to any state goal). However, Meyer is viewed by the modem Court as one of a line
of cases identifying fundamental due process rights, and claims asserting such rights now
receive strict scrutiny. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (including Meyer in
group of cases acknowledging fundamental privacy right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (asserting that Meyer upheld fundamental rights to educate children
and acquire knowledge).
40. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
42. Id. at 402.
43. Id. at 401; see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (stating that
Constitution protects rights of those who do not speak English). Of course, neither deci-
sion protected a wholesale right to speak one's language of choice. Rather, these cases
asserted that the rights of employment choice and childrearing extend to foreign-language
speakers as well as to English-speakers. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01 (holding that Ne-
braska law restricting teaching of foreign languages in schools unconstitutionally interfered
with occupation choices of language teachers and parents' educational choices for their
children); Tokushige, 273 U.S. at 298-99 (declaring that Hawaiian law regulating teaching
of foreign languages in private schools violated school owners' and parents' Fourteenth
Amendment rights to choose "teachers, curriculum and textbooks").
44. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401; see also Tokushige, 273 U.S. at 299 (striking Hawaiian law
strictly limiting and regulating foreign private schools on basis of right to choose education
for children). Nevertheless, some commentators read Meyer more broadly. See Ira C.
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 988-89
(1979) (stating that Meyer protected right to family autonomy); William G. Ross, A Judicial
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The Court's next ruling on language rights, Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,45
closely followed the substantive due process analysis of Meyer.46 How-
ever, the Yu Cong Eng Court also developed and partly relied upon an
equal protection analysis in determining that a Philippine statute forbid-
ding the use of the Chinese language for bookkeeping was unconstitu-
tional.47 In Yu Cong Eng, the Philippine legislature had passed a law
requiring that business-owners keep books in either Spanish, any of the
Philippine dialects, or English in order to detect alleged tax evasion by
Chinese merchants.48  Holding this to be unconstitutional, the Court
identified a classification: the portion of the population that spoke Chi-
nese, which was only one of many languages on the islands.49 However,
in this era prior to the explosion of equal protection cases of the 1960s,
the Court did not identify a scrutiny-level for the classification.5 ' Rather,
the Court merely looked for a rational reason for the law and, finding
none, overturned it, reiterating its holding in Meyer that the right to pur-
Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 185-86 (1988)
(arguing that "tenor" of Meyer's holding includes expansion of personal liberties). Yet,
this "tenor" has been of little service to language minorities. See Martha Minow, Learning
to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 157, 165 (1985) (noting that while Meyer was important decision in support
of linguistic pluralism, it did not elevate foreign languages to status of English or entitle
foreign students to instruction in their own language); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded
Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV.
761, 802 n.124 (noting that Meyer may have suggested right to teach in foreign language,
but later cases limit protection to instances where language is equal to race). However, the
Supreme Court has relied on Meyer in deciding numerous due process cases in contexts
other than language. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (protecting minimal edu-
cation rights of illegal alien children); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (locat-
ing fundamental right to marry in Due Process Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1967) (extending right to marry to couples of mixed ethnicity); Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 485 (finding right to privacy protects married couple's choice to use contraceptives).
45. 271 U.S. 500 (1926). This decision was decided when the Philippine islands were a
protectorate of the United States and, therefore, subject to United States constitutional
authority. Id. at 507. Because the Philippine government was not a state government, the
Court could exercise independent judgment on the construction of its statute dealing with
individual rights. Id. at 522-23. The pertinent portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights
mirrored the federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 523.
46. See Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 526-27 (citing Meyer for proposition that legislature
cannot arbitrarily interfere with occupational or educational choices).
47. Id. at 524-25.
48. Id. at 507-08.
49. See id. at 513-14 (noting that law was designed to detect Chinese tax evaders).
50. See Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstances: Accounting for
Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 518 n.271 (1991) (stating that Supreme
Court first identified suspect classification status in 1944 in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
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sue a living is fundamental under the Due Process Clause." In so doing,
the Court protected the right to pursue a living, not the right to communi-
cate in Chinese. 2
The Yu Cong Eng Court, in discussing the accommodations that lin-
guistically diverse societies must make, suggested that the size of the Chi-
nese community in the Philippines played a role in its decision.53 The
Court noted that the Chinese had been on the island for a long time, and
that Chinese merchants comprised sixty percent of the island's busi-
nesses. 4 In fact, the Court, in the same sentence as its holding, stated
that the history of the Chinese in the Philippines and the extent of their
business connections on the islands figured into the Court's decision that
the Philippine statute was unconstitutional.55 These interesting dicta sug-
gest that where a language minority comprises a large percentage of the
population, that minority might have some rights to its language. 56
These two cases illuminate the problems raised by language minorities
early in the twentieth century and tentatively identify the possible sources
of Fourteenth Amendment protection for these minorities: the right to
equal protection and the right to due process.57 Recognizing that govern-
ment classifications involving language may deserve equal protection re-
view, these early cases left to later courts the difficult task of determining
what sort of review is due. Acknowledging that state deprivation of a
right or privilege based on language may implicate the right to due pro-
cess, these cases left unanswered how far courts can or will go in protect-
ing those rights, or whether perhaps courts will take the radical step of
finding a right to language itself. Modern courts' answers to these un-
resolved questions, however, have been largely disappointing.
51. Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 524-25. In this case, the Court identified a property
interest in one's profession, which, coupled with the criminal penalties for violation of the
law, brought the issue within the purview of substantive due process. Id.
52. Id. The Court further noted that nothing prevented the Philippine government
from mandating that at least one copy of business records be kept in English, since the
violation stemmed from prohibiting any records from being kept in Chinese. Id. at 525.
53. See id. at 511-12 (noting that Chinese comprised about 60% of commercial busi-
ness in Philippines).
54. Id.
55. Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 524-25.
56. See Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic
Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761, 802 n.124 (noting that Meyer and Yu
Cong Eng, read broadly, may indicate existence of constitutional right to use language, at
least in contexts of education and conducting business); see also Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 363-64 (1991) (acknowledging that, in some contexts, language may trigger
strict scrutiny equal protection analysis).
57. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION: CLASSIFYING THE CLASS
A. Identifying Classifications
Because a classification based on language is related to a classification
based on race or ethnicity,58 the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is a good place to begin in attempting to resolve
these issues. That Clause, as well as the entire Amendment, reflects its
drafters' fears that the states, particularly those that had seceded from the
Union, would not guarantee all their citizens the most basic rights.59 The
Equal Protection Clause thus seeks to protect citizens from discrimina-
tion by ensuring that all citizens similarly situated are similarly treated.6"
Despite the protections guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause,
not all state discrimination is unconstitutional. Courts give wide defer-
ence to state legislation that discriminates in economic or social realms,
requiring only that the state have a legitimate reason for the act and that
the act be rationally related to that reason.61 Other state classifications,
58. See Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that peo-
ple's national origins are often distinguished by languages they speak), vacated as moot,
484 U.S. 806 (1987); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of
Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761, 762 (noting 1990 census data
indicated that 75% of Latinos speak Spanish); see also Christy Fisher, Hispanics Indicate
Enduring Preference for Native Language, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 14, 1994, at 26 (noting
that 77% of Latinos in United States speak some or all Spanish at home).
59. See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1061 (1978) (stating that framers of Fourteenth Amendment wanted to ensure protections
for freed slaves). The authors of the amendment did not specify exactly what rights, be-
yond equal protection of the laws, the Equal Protection Clause could protect. One com-
mentator has opined that an equal-protection fundamental right is whatever the Court says
is a fundamental right. Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123, 123 n.3 (1972); see also Daniel S. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The
Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. L. REV. 690,
706 (1995) (listing rights recognized as fundamental under equal protection as: right to
travel between states; right to marry; right of access to courts; and right to vote).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)
(stating general rule that, under Equal Protection Clause, persons in similar situations will
be treated alike); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 611 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting) (finding disproportionate imposition of burdens between similarly situated
classes unconstitutional); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 120 n.77
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting equal protection guarantees for those in similar
positions); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S, 412, 415 (1920) (observing that
Equal Protection Clause guarantees like treatment for individuals in similar
circumstances).
61. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (noting court gives legislatures "substantial latitude" to
make necessary classifications regarding social matters); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (finding
that classifications not composed of politically powerless or historically disadvantaged
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such as gender, are given less deference by the courts. The Supreme
Court has found these groups, labeled "quasi-suspect," to be deserving of
heightened judicial review.62 When a state discriminates against a quasi-
suspect group, it must provide an important reason and demonstrate that
its chosen means are substantially related to that reason.63
Some classifications, on the other hand, are suspect and thus presump-
tively unconstitutional.' Generally, courts will consider factors such as
groups will not merit strict scrutiny); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (stat-
ing that in economics and social welfare legislation, state classifications are valid if they
have "reasonable basis"). However, sometimes the Court will use the rational-basis test to
overturn a state act, applying it with what one scholar has termed, a "bite." Gerald Gun-
ther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1972). This review places emphasis on the
means-ends test, allowing for a narrower ground of decision. Id. at 20; see also Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (invalidating Alaska law that rewarded citizens for resi-
dency by giving them benefits while denying benefits to new residents, even though Court
failed to find suspect class or fundamental right implicated); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-24
(holding that education was not fundamental right and undocumented alienage not suspect
classification, yet still striking Texas law forbidding education of alien children because of
harmful effects it inflicted on "innocent" class-children). This analysis is similar to "the
sliding scale approach" advocated by Justice Thurgood Marshall throughout his career.
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 344-45 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (advocating
abandonment of two-tiered analysis); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Court's equal protection analysis amounted to "spectrum of standards,"
with results depending on significance of interests at stake). Justice Stevens also viewed
the Court's descriptions of its equal protection tests skeptically; he advocated a rationality
test that would be applied to all claims in the same fashion and would involve scrutiny of
the legitimacy of goals and neutrality of purpose. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny to Massachusetts hiring preference plan that favored male applicants);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-204 (1976) (overturning law, under intermediate scru-
tiny, which prohibited sale of 3.2% beer to males, but not females, under 21 years of age);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (striking Idaho probate code preferring men to wo-
men as estate administrators); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16 (noting that Court ap-
plies intermediate scrutiny when "concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be
clearly ascertained from the Constitution and our cases").
63. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (stating that gender
classifications require "exceedingly persuasive" justifications) (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at
273); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny to claim of admissions discrimination in all-female nursing school).
64. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 576
(4th ed. 1991) (stating that classifications based on race or nationality are presumed sus-
pect because of courts' views of Fourteenth Amendment and history surrounding it, and,
further, that classifications based on alienage are also presumed suspect, although not as
strictly scrutinized as race or nationality classifications); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272
(recognizing that certain classifications "supply a reason to infer antipathy") (quoting
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
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historical discrimination, insularity of the group, and immutability of the
characteristic used as the basis of a classification to determine whether a
group is suspect.65 Thus, state actions that facially discriminate based on
race, national origin, and alienage receive the courts' most stringent re-
view. 66 The state must show a compelling purpose for discriminating
against these groups and must demonstrate that the challenged act is fit-
ted narrowly to achieving that purpose.67 In these cases, the courts often
look for less discriminatory alternatives available to the state, because if
such alternatives are available, the discrimination is not narrowly fitted to
the state's compelling reason.68  However, when plaintiffs challenge
facially neutral laws that have discriminatory effects on suspect classes,
the courts place on those plaintiffs a heightened burden: they must
65. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (introducing
idea that claims by some "discrete and insular minorities" might receive closer judicial
review than those protesting economic or social legislation); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at
216-17 & 218 n.14 (listing traditional indicia of suspectness: classifications that are more
likely than others to reflect prejudice; classifications irrelevant to proper legislative goal;
and classifications involving groups in position of "political powerlessness"); Mark
Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or
Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 937, 939 (1991) (listing Supreme Court's criteria for determin-
ing if class is suspect: that class is discrete and insular; that class has disability over which it
has no control; that class's defining characteristic bears no rational relation to legitimate
state purpose; that class has suffered history of discrimination; and that there is stigma
attached to being member of class).
66. See Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986) (iden-
tifying classifications based on race, alienage or national origin as suspect); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (agreeing that race, alienage, and national origin are
"inherently suspect" classifications). In addition to race and national origin, in some cases
the Court has found alienage to be a suspect classification. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S.
216, 227 (1984) (protecting aliens from exclusion from notary public positions); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (finding that city application of ordinance regulating
laundries unconstitutionally discriminated against Chinese aliens); see also Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 219-20 (refusing to give class of illegal aliens heightened scrutiny, but providing protec-
tion from denial of minimal education for their children).
67. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 (stating that under strict scrutiny, government act
must be closely fitted to achieving compelling government purpose); Feeney, 442 U.S. at
272 (asserting that discrimination against suspect classes may only be upheld for extraordi-
nary reasons under strict scrutiny review); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) (formulating early strict scrutiny standard for racial classifications).
68. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 199 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that, under strict scrutiny, proposed state act must be more narrowly tailored to
purpose than any other remedy); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (holding that, under
strict scrutiny, state act can only survive if there is no alternative).
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:149
demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional rather than
coincidental.6 9
Nonetheless, language minorities making equal protection claims are
generally stopped well before having to prove intent, because although
language minorities share many of the traits of suspect classes, language
discrimination nearly always receives minimal scrutiny.7" While there is
universal agreement that language is related to national origin, there is
widespread belief that language is not equal to national origin.7 Further,
the Supreme Court has held that a state may legitimately discriminate on
the basis of a trait that is connected to a suspect or quasi-suspect group,
so long as that trait is relevant to the state action. 72 In language discrimi-
69. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977) (necessitating proof of discriminatory intent to sustain equal protection
claim); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (requiring demonstration of pur-
poseful discrimination in admission tests for police force); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 547-49 (1972) (requiring showing of discriminatory intent in distribution of welfare
funds); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying plaintiffs claim
of disparate impact of crack cocaine sentences on minorities because plaintiff had not al-
leged discriminatory intent in formation of Sentencing Guidelines); see also Daniel J. Gar-
field, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-
Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690, 712 (1995) (noting that discriminatory intent
requirement illustrates that equal protection guarantees are designed to guarantee access
to political processes); Jeffery A. Kruse, Substantive Equal Protection Analysis Under State
v. Russell, and the Potential Impact on the Criminal Justice System, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1791, 1792 (1993) (noting that intent requirement excludes many valid equal protec-
tion claims of adverse impact on minorities).
70. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (allowing language-
based juror challenge under minimal scrutiny test where no race/language nexus exists);
Pabon v. McIntosh, 546 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that because language
is not directly related to specific national origin, minimal scrutiny is appropriate standard
of review).
71. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding language,
alone, is not suspect classification), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984); Frontera v. Sindell,
522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that language classifications are not equal to
those made on basis of nationality or race); Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306
(D.P.R. 1992) (noting courts generally avoid analysis of language under equal protection,
but when they conduct such analysis, require language/national origin nexus); Flores v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (holding that language is not
suspect classification), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996); Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Lan-
guage Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for
Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 486 (1994) (noting that most courts which have
considered language issues have found that language classifications alone do not merit
strict or heightened scrutiny).
72. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985)
(holding that courts are reluctant to invalidate state classifications when made on basis of
characteristics relevant to state interest); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (commenting that courts should not apply strict scrutiny where legisla-
ture has discriminated based on relevant characteristic). Of course, many language minori-
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nation cases, language is often held to be relevant to the state's asserted
purpose.73 In fact, in the latest Supreme Court case to address equal pro-
tection rights for language minorities, the Court stated that language abil-
ity could justify peremptory challenges, in part because language ability
could be relevant to a potential juror's ability to accept court translations
of testimony.74
B. Hernandez v. New York: The Supreme Court's Latest Word
on Language
In Hernandez v. New York,75 a criminal defendant claimed that two
prospective jurors had been excused during voir dire examination merely
because they spoke Spanish.76 Relying on Batson v. Kentucky,7 which
ties claim discriminatory intent against race or national origin groups lurks behind English-
only legislation and proposals. See Kathryn K. Imahara & Ki Kim, English Only-Racism
in Disguise: An Analysis of Dimaranan v. PVHMC, 23 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 107, 108-09
(1992) (linking advent of English-only proposals to anti-immigration movements); Ken-
neth L. Karst, Essay: Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.
L. REv. 303, 352 (1986) (asserting that language differences provide both way to rationalize
discrimination and means of accomplishing it); Joseph Leibowicz, The Proposed English
Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 519, 538 (1985) (argu-
ing that immigration restriction was goal of movements to limit foreign language use at
beginning of century); Michael Arington, Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation:
The Battle in the States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 326 (1991) (stat-
ing that growing popularity of English-only legislation is probably linked to increased
number of immigrants); Valerie A. Lexion, Note, Language Minority Voting Rights and the
English Language Amendment, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 657, 661 (1987) (tracing new
interest in English-only laws to fear of new wave of immigration); Mike Doming & Melita
M. Garza, English Language Gains New Meaning in National Politics, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19,
1995, at 1 (quoting Edward Chen, staff attorney for ACLU of Northern California's Lan-
guage Rights Project: "You cannot disassociate the whole language movement from the
backlash and movement against immigration."); USA Doesn't Need 'Official Language',
USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1990, at 6A (arguing that English-only laws are designed to exclude
and will divide country by encouraging bigotry).
73. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362 (upholding juror exclusion on basis of language
because English deficiency might result in jurors' inability to accept court translations);
Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 862 (3d Cir.) (accepting prosecutor's explanation that
Spanish-speaking jurors would have trouble accepting translation, and allowing them to be
excluded on that basis), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 439 (1994); Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1219 (stat-
ing that because Civil Service system required use of English language, administration of
Civil Service examinations in English was reasonable); Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131 (stating
that language classification was relevant to goal of providing meaningful probation).
74. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370 (finding "legitimate" prosecutor's explanation that
he excused Spanish-speaking jurors for fear they would not accept official translation of
proceedings).
75. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
76. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356.
77. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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held that challenging prospective jurors on the basis of race violated the
equal protection rights of criminal defendants and voir dire members,78
the defendant claimed that the prosecutor had violated Batson by chal-
lenging these language minorities.79
According to Batson, when a defendant makes a prima facie case that a
prosecutor has exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race, the
prosecutor must then present a race-neutral reason for that challenge."
If the prosecutor does not sufficiently meet this burden, the strike will not
be allowed.81 In Hernandez, the prosecutor justified his challenges of the
Spanish-speaking voir dire members by arguing that he feared the Span-
ish-speaking jurors would be unable to accept the official court transla-
tion of Spanish testimony.82 The prosecutor further argued that because
the victims of the crime were Latino, he had no motive to discriminate
against jurors who might actually be sympathetic to his case. 3
The plurality of the Court accepted the prosecution's justifications,
holding that the prosecutor's challenge did not divide jurors racially, but
according to whether they would have difficulty accepting an English
translation.84 Because each group included both Latinos and non-Lati-
nos, there was no division along racial lines.85 This holding indicates that
the present Supreme Court will require a plaintiff to show a connection
between language and race or national origin before finding a language
classification suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.8 6
78. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-87. This principle has since been extended to gender-based
juror discrimination. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994).
79. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355.
80. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
81. See id. at 99-100 n.24 (noting that trial court may either reinstate improperly chal-
lenged jurors or reelect new jury from different panel).
82. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 357 n.1. The prosecutor said:
I felt that from their answers they would be hard pressed to accept what the inter-
preter said as the final thing on what the record would be, and I even had to ask the
[jiudge to question them on that, and their answers were-I thought they both indi-
cated that they would have trouble, although their final answer was they could do it. I
just felt from the hesitancy in their answers and their lack of eye contact that they
would not be able to do it.
Id.
83. Id. at 357.
84. Id. at 361.
85. Id.
86. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (stating, "[wie would face a quite different case if
the prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the explanation that he did not
want Spanish-speaking jurors"); see also Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995) (en banc) (Meyers, J., concurring) (stating that discrimination based on lan-
guage that is pretext for race discrimination is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716
(1996); Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection
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However, in dicta remarkably like that in Yu Cong Eng, which dis-
cussed the size of the Chinese community in the Philippines,8 7 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the plurality, warned of the dangers of racial stereo-
types in a community with a large, Spanish-speaking Latino population. 8
Justice Kennedy stated that a trial judge could take these contextual mat-
ters into account when determining whether a prosecutor's challenge
amounted to intentional discrimination on the basis of race.8 9 Because
Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 487
(1994) (arguing that language/race nexus is required in order to merit strict scrutiny). But
see Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that, in cases involving
juror discrimination, language discrimination could never merit strict scrutiny, no matter
how closely related to race); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 (3d Cir.) (holding juror
challenges made only on basis of language are not invalid under Batson), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 439 (1994).
87. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1925).
88. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363-64 (noting that language could be pretext for race-
based peremptory challenges). Later in the decision, Kennedy wrote, "It may well be, for
certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language,
like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analy-
sis." Id. at 371.
89. Id. at 371-72. But see id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that equal
protection strict scrutiny does not apply to cases in which race\language nexus exits, but
only to cases of intentional race discrimination). Part of the Court's problem here may be
the "slippery" nature of race definitions. See id. at 371 (plurality opinion) (declining to
decide "difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race should be defined
for equal protection purposes"); United States v. Ortiz, 897 F. Supp. 199, 203 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (discussing difficulty of classifying Latinos and determining that Latino "is not a
biological characteristic but a psychological characteristic as to how one defines himself or
herself"); Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimina-
tion, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L. REV. 662, 676-80 (1975) (discussing elu-
siveness of race definitions); Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors,
and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20 (1992) (noting Court's "overly narrow"
interpretation of 'race-neutrality' and ambiguity over its definition of 'race'); Deborah A.
Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service,
1993 Wis. L. REV. 761, 803-04 (arguing for definition of race that would "acknowledge that
ethnic and racial identity amount to more than one's skin color and the birth place of one's
ancestors"). Of course, two general problems with equal protection have been determin-
ing a "baseline" for equality and determining just "how equal" individuals should be. In
addressing the first question, consider that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment de-
bated and dismissed as ridiculous the idea that the protection would extend to women, who
were not "similarly situated" with men. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 306-07 (1990) (stating that proponents of
Fourteenth Amendment suggested that because women did not belong to same "class" as
men, they would not have to be treated equally to men, only to other women). For an
example of disagreement over the second question, consider that in Ex parte Virginia, a
decision forbidding race-based juror exclusion, Justice Field noted that equal protection is
not the same as equal participation. 100 U.S. 339, 367 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting). Justice
Field pointed out that although women were not allowed to participate in the political
process, they were nonetheless equally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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the plurality accepted the prosecution's justification for the challenges,
however, it never reached the question of whether language, by itself,
could trigger a suspect classification.9"
C. Confusion in the Lower Courts: Is There a Nexus Requirement?
Thus, the Hernandez Court did little to resolve confusion in the lower
courts regarding which protections and rights should be afforded lan-
guage minorities under the Equal Protection Clause. 91 No lower court
has found language, by itself, to be a suspect classification.92 However, a
few courts have found a sufficient connection between language and na-
90. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (stating that Court's holding does not settle issue
of when language-based discrimination could be viewed as pretext for racial discrimina-
tion). In fact, Justice O'Connor, writing a concurrence joined by Justice Scalia, explicitly
rejected this idea and seemed, as well, to reject Justice Kennedy's suggestion that a race/
language nexus could trigger strict scrutiny. See id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that only classifications directly based on race and national origin will support Bat-
son challenge). Moreover, the plurality's holding strongly suggests that some relationship
to race, even if tenuous, will be required. See id. at 371 (holding that if reason for chal-
lenge is other than race, challenge is race neutral); Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language
Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or
Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REv. 481,487 (1994) (arguing that victims of language discrimination
must be able to show nexus between language and suspect classification); see also Deborah
A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 761, 761 (asserting that in Hernandez, Supreme Court "effectively per-
mitted the government arbitrarily to exclude all Spanish-speaking prospective jurors in
every case where any witness will testify in Spanish"). Following Hernandez, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed this issue and held that peremp-
tory challenges based solely on foreign language ability would not receive strict scrutiny.
Beyer, 19 F.3d at 871.
91. Compare Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
equal protection violation because investigation singled out specific language, thus trigger-
ing race/language connection), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987), with Pagan v. Dubois,
884 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D. Mass. 1995) (opining in dicta that language-based discrimination
claims should not succeed).
92. See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 870 (3d Cir.) (asserting that claims against
peremptory juror challenges based on language do not merit strict or heightened scrutiny),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 439 (1994); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1983)
(finding that there is no equal protection violation when notices denying Social Security
benefits are not sent in Spanish, because language, alone, is not suspect classification), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587
F.2d 1022, 1026 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that classification of students based on language
ability in denial of remedial, bilingual instruction will not receive strict scrutiny); Frontera
v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that language classifications are not
equal to those made on basis of nationality or race); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738,
739 (9th Cir. 1973) (subjecting language-based distinction to minimal scrutiny); Pabon v.
McIntosh, 546 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that prison's failure to provide
courses in Spanish does not implicate suspect classification, because language is not di-
rectly related to national origin).
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tional origin to trigger strict scrutiny.93 Those cases in which plaintiffs
have made successful claims often involved blatant discrimination against
a particular language minority rather than the denial of benefits or of
notice in a language other than English.94 In addition, courts giving lan-
guage classifications strict scrutiny have generally done so because the
discrimination has been based on proficiency in a specific foreign lan-
guage rather than a general deficiency in English."
In Olagues v. Russoniello,96 for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a voter registration
fraud investigation that singled out Spanish-speaking and Chinese-speak-
ing foreign-born voters violated the Equal Protection Clause.97 In hold-
ing that it did, the court distinguished the case from cases involving the
distribution of benefits by observing that, in the latter cases, no specific
93. See Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1521 (holding that "specific" classifications of Spanish
and Chinese speakers will trigger strict scrutiny, while general classification of "non-Eng-
lish speakers" may not); Asian Am. Bus. Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328,1330
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that person's language flows from his or her national origin);
Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306 (D.P.R. 1992) (finding that when language,
which includes surnames, accents, and behavior patterns, is used to discriminate against
certain groups, language is indicia of national origin); see also Thongvanh v. Thalacker, 17
F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1994) (asking prison to show merely that not allowing prisoner to
correspond to his family in Lao is reasonably related to legitimate penological goal, but
finding that presence of less discriminatory alternatives rendered policy unconstitutional).
The Benitez court added that laws without the language/national origin nexus should, if
they have a sufficient adverse impact on minorities, be evaluated under the intermediate
standard of review. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. at 308-09.
94. Compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking law that discrimi-
nated against foreign language teachers), with Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 43 (refusing to
order state to issue Social Security benefit notices in Spanish). The recent Texas cases
illustrate this distinction nicely. Part of Mr. Flores's claim rests on the assumption that the
county in which he was sentenced should provide rehabilitative services in Spanish to avoid
language discrimination. See Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(en banc) (noting Mr. Flores's claim that not having alcohol treatment in Spanish dispro-
portionately impacts Latinos), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996). On the other hand, the
case of Ms. Laureno, who was ordered to stop speaking Spanish to her daughter, involves
discrimination on the basis of language, and a remedy would not impose an affirmative
duty on the state, other than to avoid such discrimination. See supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
95. Compare Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1521 (declaring investigation into Spanish- and Chi-
nese-speaking voters unconstitutional), and Asian Am. Bus. Group, 716 F. Supp. at 1332
(finding ordinance discriminating against language-minority advertising violates equal pro-
tection), with Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991) (allowing peremptory chal-
lenges to prospective jurors because of ability to speak Spanish), and Flores, 904 S.W.2d at
131 (upholding denial of probation based on inability to speak English).
96. 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986).
97. Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1521.
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foreign languages had been singled out for discrimination.98 The investi-
gation under consideration, on the other hand, specified languages, thus
unconstitutionally making distinctions based on nationality.
99
Three years after the Olagues decision, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, in Asian American Business Group
v. City of Pomona'00 rejected the requirement that a specific language be
the basis of discriminatory treatment to establish a race/language nexus
under the Equal Protection Clause. 10 The court struck a city ordinance,
aimed at advertisements in the Chinese language, that mandated that all
commercial signs with language in "foreign alphabetical characters"
98. Id. Olagues, however, invites a broader reading that would suggest that language
distinctions are generally based on national origin. See id. at 1520 (stating that "an individ-
ual's primary language skill generally flows from his or her national origin"). At least one
commentator, however, believes the Olagues test is not strict enough. See Andrew P.
Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause: When Is Lan-
guage a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 490 (1994) (arguing that
Olagues test, which focuses on objective quality of discrimination and whether it amounts
to classification traditionally viewed as suspect, should be replaced by test which focuses on
whether state actor subjectively intended to discriminate against suspect class). The
Supreme Court has refused to hold unconstitutional trait-based discrimination related to
gender, holding that refusal to provide disability insurance for pregnant women did not
discriminate against all women, because not all women became pregnant. Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1979). The Court contended that the classification benefit-
ted all people who were "not pregnant," including women as well as men. Id. Thus, the
Flores court could no more equate language to race than the Geduldig Court could equate
pregnancy to gender. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131 (placing Mr. Flores in class of con-
victed drunk drivers who could not speak English, rather than in class of Latinos). The
class allegedly unharmed, comprised of English-speakers, could include people of Spanish
descent, and the class allegedly harmed, non-English speakers, could include people from
all races. Cf Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic
Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761, 764 n.8 (observing that Congress so
objected to Geduldig decision, it passed Pregnancy Disability Act, making discrimination
on basis of pregnancy equal to gender discrimination). For an uncharacteristically broad
interpretation of race that might include such race-based traits as language, see St. Francis
College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987), where the Supreme Court found that people
of "Arabian" ancestry may claim racial discrimination under Title VII and identified sus-
pect classes for Title VII purposes as "identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to
intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added). Concurring in the AI-Khazraji decision, Jus-
tice Brennan asserted that there would be no bright line between discrimination based on
ancestry or ethnic characteristics and discrimination based on race or national origin. Id. at
614 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
99. Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1520.
100. 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
101. See id. at 1332 (stating that act prohibiting use of foreign alphabetical characters
is discrimination against national origin, even if specific national origin is not named).
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maintain English alphabetical characters on at least one-half the sign.10 2
The ordinance was found unconstitutional even though it did not single
out a particular language or race for discriminatory treatment. 10 3 The
court reasoned that by only striking state acts that discriminate against
specific languages, cities and states could avoid strict scrutiny by making a
general classification against non-English speakers that nevertheless dis-
criminates against targeted language groups. °4
In contrast to these cases, the great majority of language discrimination
claims deal with a service or benefit denied to the claimant because of an
English deficiency. 10 5 Because such policies do not discriminate against
any particular racial or minority group, and because members of suspect
classifications who are able to speak English are not harmed by such poli-
cies, courts generally have not subjected these classifications to strict
scrutiny.10 6 For example, in Soberal-Perez v. Heckler,'0 7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, using the rational-basis
test, affirmed the lower court's holding that the state Social Security Ad-
ministration did not violate the equal protection rights of non-English
speakers by refusing to provide notice of the withdrawal of benefits in
102. Id. at 1332. The court found that two equal protection principles had been vio-
lated. Id. First, it held that a fundamental interest, free expression, had been violated by
an impermissible classification. Id. Second, it held that the ordinance discriminated on the
basis of national origin. Id.
103. Id. at 1332-33.
104. Asian Am. Bus. Group, 716 F. Supp. at 1332-33; see also Benitez, 806 F. Supp. at
308 (suggesting that there may be cases where language alone, without national origin
nexus, requires heightened scrutiny). The Benitez court stated that forbidding a person
from speaking his or her native language (in this case, English) requires, unfairly, that
everyone speak one language, although some people favor another. Id. This distinction
between general and specific language classifications explains the result in Flores, in which
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the denial of Mr. Flores's probation was
not based on the fact that he spoke only Spanish, but on the fact that he did not speak
English. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130.
105. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 42 (rejecting claim that failure to provide
notice of withdrawal of Social Security benefits in Spanish violates Equal Protection
Clause); Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1219 (holding that Civil Service is not required to give tests
in foreign languages); Carmona, 475 F.2d at 739 (finding no right to notice of denial of
unemployment benefits in claimant's language); see also Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131 (re-
jecting Mr. Flores's claim that failure to provide alcohol rehabilitation in Spanish language
adversely affects Latinos).
106. See, e.g., Tempe, 587 F.2d at 1026 n.3 (denying request for bilingual, bicultural
education, in part because failure to provide these classifies students on basis of linguistic
ability rather than race); Carmona, 475 F.2d at 739 (denying request to have unemploy-
ment notices written in Spanish); Pagan, 884 F. Supp. at 28 (suggesting that prisoner's right
to Spanish-speaking medical providers and counselors is not protected by Constitution).
107. 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984).
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Spanish.1"8 In its decision, the lower court noted that the regulation may
have had a disproportionate adverse impact on Latinos, but that this im-
pact was not intentional and, therefore, not unconstitutional. 0 9
Language minorities in the criminal justice system have faced the same
difficulties in making equal protection claims."' In Pabon v. McIn-
tosh,"' for example, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania refused to consider a claim by Spanish-speaking
prisoners that their equal protection rights were violated by the prison's
refusal to provide educational programs in Spanish." 2 The court held
that the failure to provide multilingual education did not trigger strict
scrutiny because the absence of multilingual education injured not just
Spanish-speaking prisoners, but all prisoners who did not speak English,
regardless of their national origin." 3 Similarly, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts in Pagan v. Dubois'14 refused to
certify a class of Latinos who claimed that the failure to provide medical
treatment and counseling for HIV-positive Latino prisoners in Spanish
violated the prisoners' equal protection rights." 5 Although the court rec-
ognized in theory the opportunity for individual language-minority plain-
tiffs to make this claim," 6 in dicta surely designed to discourage future
suits, the court then suggested that equal protection meant equality, not
108. Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 41-42.
109. Soberal-Perez v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 1164, 1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd sub
nom. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984).
110. See Sisneros v. Nix, 884 F. Supp. 1313, 1333 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (denying prisoner's
claim that policy of not allowing correspondence in Native American language violated
equal protection as applied). But see Thongvanh, 17 F.3d at 259 (stating that prison policy
of denying prisoner correspondence in his native language of Lao could impinge upon his
equal protection rights because prison had reasonable alternatives); cf Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974) (limiting censorship of prisoner mail to cases where sub-
stantial governmental interest, unrelated to goal of suppression, exists). Violations of
rights that are related to prison efficiency and security concerns are subjected only to a
"reasonable relationship test," which asks if the regulation is "rationally related to legiti-
mate penological interests." Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990) (quoting Tr-
ner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see also Sisneros, 884 F. Supp. at 1323 (applying
standard to prison mail censorship). Generally, prisoners retain due process, freedom of
speech and religion, freedom from racial discrimination, and Eighth Amendment rights.
Jill A. Schaar, Prisoners' Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy: Expanding a Constricted
View, 22 Hous. L. REv. 1065, 1066-67 (1985).
111. 546 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
112. Pabon, 546 F. Supp. at 1340.
113. Id.
114. 884 F. Supp. 25 (D. Mass. 1995).




favoritism.'1 7 The court asserted that language-discrimination claims en-
courage cultural "balkanization." 118
Clearly, courts in modern equal protection cases have struggled with
the issue of whether language minorities merit strict scrutiny, either be-
cause their national origin strongly correlates with the language they
speak, or because language, by itself, raises similar concerns as those
raised by discrimination based on race.11 9 Currently, the Supreme
Court's position suggests that while a language minority's equal protec-
tion claim may succeed if the claim establishes a sufficient nexus between
the language discrimination and the state's animosity toward race or na-
tional origin, language by itself will not trigger strict scrutiny.
120
IV. DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: No ROOM UNDER
THE PENUMBRA?
A. Fundamental Rights and Finding a Place to Stand
Because of the treacherous path language minorities face in making
equal protection claims against a state, their cases should also be evalu-
ated for the presence of an implicated fundamental right, which also
would trigger strict judicial review.' 2 ' Many of these rights are explicitly
stated in the Constitution although they can be complicated in applica-
122tion. Among these are rights incorporated from the Bill of Rights into
117. Id.
118. Id. at 27.
119. See, e.g., Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363-64 (holding that language may, in some
circumstances, be surrogate for race); Beyer, 19 F.3d at 870 (stating language-based juror
discrimination is not racial discrimination); Olagues, 797 F.2d at 1521 (finding race is equal
to language where discrimination is on basis of particular language); Benitez, 806 F. Supp.
at 308-09 (holding that language discrimination must be aimed at race or national origin to
be suspect, but where no nexus exists, might merit intermediate scrutiny).
120. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (holding that while juror challenge based on rea-
son other than race will always be race-neutral, use of language as surrogate for race may
trigger strict scrutiny).
121. See, e.g., Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir.
1995) (relying on First Amendment to invalidate English-only amendment to Arizona's
constitution), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996); Sisneros v. Nix, 884 F. Supp. 1313, 1323
(S.D. Iowa 1995) (finding First Amendment rights implicated in prison policy against for-
eign-language correspondence).
122. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different
from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 785 (1994) (stating that fundamental rights
include those explicitly enumerated in Constitution and those Court has recognized as nec-
essary to liberty); Ronald Dworkin, The Concept of Enumerated Rights: Unenumerated
Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Cil. L. REV. 381, 381-82
(1992) (observing existence in Constitution of "concrete" rights, rights of "medium ab-
straction," and abstract rights).
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 3 to protect indi-
viduals against state action impinging on those rights.' 24 For example,
the right to free speech is somewhat self-defining and easy to locate in the
Constitution, as is the right to freely exercise one's religion.12 5 Language
minorities, in making a discrimination claim against the federal or state
government, may sometimes successfully avail themselves of these ex-
plicit rights. 26 In Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,27 for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
Arizona's English-only constitutional amendment violated free speech
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. 128 Likewise, in United States
v. Mayans,'129 the Ninth Circuit also held that the Fifth Amendment guar-
anteed to defendants the right to have interpreters at critical stages of
criminal proceedings. 30
The Due Process Clause also protects a more nebulous set of substan-
tive rights, which the Supreme Court has deemed "fundamental.'
131
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "[nlo person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
124. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968) (incorporating right to
jury trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (incorporating right to coun-
sel at trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating exclusionary rule for
illegally seized evidence); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (incorporat-
ing right to free speech).
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting explicitly rights of free speech and exercise
of religion); JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 382-83 (4th ed.
1991) (describing incorporation doctrine as means for courts to replace vague substantive
due process, based on natural law, with specific protections enumerated in Bill of Rights).
126. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924 (holding that Arizona's English-only amendment
violated First Amendment free speech rights); United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181
(9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Fifth Amendment mandates provision of interpreter at trial).
127. 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
128. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924.
129. 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994).
130. See Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1181 (explaining that defendant's Fifth Amendment right
was violated when interpreter was withdrawn).
131. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 931 (1988) (noting
fundamental rights involve ambiguity and vagueness); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1031-32 (1979) (attributing right of
travel to structure of Constitution, but right to privacy and family rights to "naked judicial
judgment"). Technically, the Fourteenth Amendment protects two sets of fundamental
rights: due process rights and equal protection rights. In addition to ensuring a right to
proper procedure, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing factors
for balancing test for procedural due process analysis), due process also protects the sub-
stantive rights of life, liberty, and property, as well as rights associated with personal pri-
vacy and family decision making. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87
(1978) (affirming freedom to marry as due process right and extending equal protection
analysis to state classifications burdening that right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56
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These rights emerged from the shadows of the Bill of Rights, and their
elusiveness is coupled with the Supreme Court's traditional reluctance to
identify new substantive or 'positive' rights in a Constitution that puta-
tively guarantees only 'negative' rights.132
B. Due Process: What Duty?
The bases for these substantive due process rights are difficult to lo-
cate. 133 Undoubtedly, the idea that individuals possess basic rights vis-A-
(1973) (finding right to abortion within privacy right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) (acknowledging right to purchase contraceptives). Next, the Equal Protection
Clause, in addition to affirmatively guaranteeing the right to equal protection of the laws,
protects the rights of classes of individuals in the areas of interstate travel, access to the
courts, and voting. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (asserting that "funda-
mental fairness" requires meaningful access to courts); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 57,
65 (1982) (holding that discrimination between old state residents and new state residents
violates right to migrate); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966)
(holding state may not use individual wealth to keep citizens from voting). For a detailed
discussion of the source of the split between the two sets of fundamental rights, see Viktor
Mayer-Schonberger, Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Fundamental
Rights Realm, 33 How. L.J. 287 passim (1990). Because Mr. Flores's putative claims arise
from the Due Process Clause, this Comment focuses on case law analyzing that Clause.
An Equal Protection Clause fundamental rights analysis would be identical: an act dis-
criminating against a language minority that impinges on any fundamental right should
receive strict scrutiny. See Gomez v. Myers, 627 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (hold-
ing that refusing to accept prisoner's pleading, written in Spanish, violated his equal-pro-
tection fundamental right of access to courts). However, most courts considering the issue
have found no affirmative fundamental rights for language minorities based on their lan-
guage under the Equal Protection Clause. See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding no fundamental right to bilingual
or bicultural education for language minorities); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1220
(6th Cir. 1975) (finding no equal protection right to public employment and thus no state
duty to provide Spanish interpretation of Civil Service exam). Nevertheless, where an ac-
knowledged equal-protection fundamental right, such as access to the judicial system, is at
stake, the result is different. See Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (sug-
gesting prison may have to accommodate prisoner's "linguistic skills" in staffing law li-
brary). Under equal protection analysis, benefits that the government is not bound to
grant initially must still be distributed on equal terms once offered. See Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (holding that state may not classify citizens by length of
residency for purposes of distributing welfare benefits); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-58 (1963) (stating that access to appellate courts for convicted criminals cannot be
denied on basis of indigency).
132. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (characterizing
Constitution as charter of negative rights); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A
Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272 (1990) (noting that courts maintain notion that Con-
stitution only imposes negative duty on government to refrain from depriving citizens of
rights).
133. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (admitting that some due pro-
cess rights have "little or no textual support" in Constitution); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger,
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vis their government arises from early notions of natural law.' 3 4 In the
early part of the century, courts increasingly found in the Due Process
Clause a textual basis for these rights. 35 Initially, this clause protected
the rights most central to a newly industrialized nation: the right to con-
tract and to own property.136 The Supreme Court relied on these rights
to strike a spate of state legislation aimed at improving the lot of Depres-
sion-era workers in the 1930s.137 However, the ascendancy of positivist
legal theory and the concomitant retreat from natural law theory effec-
tively eliminated the Court's willingness to interfere with economic regu-
lation on substantive due process grounds.' 38
Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Fundamental Rights Realm, 33 How.
L.J. 287, 288 (1990) (listing natural law, Fifth Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion clauses of Fourteenth Amendment as alternately suggested sources of substantive due
process rights). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judi-
cial Review and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (arguing that
substantive due process is more firmly rooted in Constitution than commonly believed).
134. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (connecting due
process to natural law theory); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (asserting that right to privacy is best supported by concepts found in natu-
ral law). Natural law has been defined as "a set of general moral standards, in contrast to
the existing positive law of statutes, codes, and decisions of the legal institutions." David S.
Bogen, The Transportation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admission
of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 947 (1985).
135. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 981, 986 (1979) (noting that Due Process Clause was most relied-upon clause of
Fourteenth Amendment from 1879 to 1937); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Substantive Due
Process and Equal Protection in the Fundamental Rights Realm, 33 How. L.J. 287, 288
(1990) (stating that, following Civil War, liberty right provided foundation for many due
process fundamental rights decisions).
136. See Michael W. Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Antidiscrimination: On the Intel-
lectual Origins of the Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1176
(1991) (stating that substantive due process theory originally protected property interests
through Contract Clause and, later, through Due Process Clause); see also Daniel 0. Con-
kle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 216-17 (1987) (stating
first substantive meaning given to due process involved laissez-faire economic theory).
The Dred Scott decision may be the most notorious example of this use. See Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-51 (1856) (holding slaveowners have property interest
in slaves and may have slaves returned even after they had escaped to nonslave states).
137. See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (invalidating rate regulations for
employment agencies), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference &
Bond Assoc., Inc., 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908)
(finding anti-union contracts violative of Due Process Clause), overruled in part by Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905) (forbidding regulation of bakers' work hours as violative of bakers'
right to contract), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
138. See Michael W. Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Antidiscrimination: On the Intel-
lectual Origins of the Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165,
1192-93 (1991) (claiming that positivist attempts to find historical, cultural, or sociological
[Vol. 28:149
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At about the same time, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska signaled its
willingness to turn its attention to protecting non-economic substantive
due process rights.139 At first, only a few cases followed the Meyer hold-
ing in identifying and protecting substantive rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 140 However, in 1965, the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut14 ' revived substantive due process by suggesting that the Bill
of Rights casts a "penumbra" which contains a right to privacy. 142 Aris-
ing from Griswold and cases following it is a set of rights surrounding the
family, procreation, marriage, and personal autonomy. 43
Based on rights such as these, courts analyze substantive due process
claims under two tiers of review.144 If the state impinges on any of these
fundamental rights or the rights incorporated into the Due Process
Clause, the state must then demonstrate under strict scrutiny that it has a
compelling interest in the impingement and that its chosen means are
necessary to achieve that interest. 145  If, on the other hand, the chal-
rationale for law attacked theoretical bases of natural law theory); cf. West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (holding that liberty to contract is subject to re-
straints of due process, thereby allowing government to regulate employment contracts).
139. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (identifying "liberty" rights of
contract, choice of employment, choice of education, marriage, childrearing, religion, and
pursuit of happiness); William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical
Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 125 (1988) (maintaining that Meyer heralded new
period of substantive due process protection).
140. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that states must provide
counsel in felony cases for some indigent defendants); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534 (1925) (invalidating state law that banned private religious schools because law
interfered with upbringing of children).
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
142. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (locat-
ing right to terminate pregnancy within zone of privacy). Some commentators have
claimed the penumbra theory has been abandoned in favor of direct reliance on substan-
tive due process as the source of the right to privacy. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MicH. L. REV. 981, 994-99 (1979) (asserting later
decisions indicate source of right to privacy is Fourteenth Amendment); Viktor Mayer-
Schonberger, Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Fundamental Rights
Realm, 33 How. L.J. 287, 290 n.20 (1990) (claiming Court has abandoned penumbra
theory).
143. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978) (affirming fundamental
right to marry); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (holding due
process prohibited ban on sale of nonmedical contraception to minors); Roe, 410 U.S. at
152-53 (finding, within right to privacy, fundamental right to terminate pregnancy); Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (finding fundamental right to privacy).
144. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (stating that while Court will not give strict scrutiny
to laws involving economic or social issues, it will carefully scrutinize laws that touch on
fundamental rights).
145. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different
from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 781, 785-86 (1994) (stating strict scrutiny of
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lenged act is in an economic or social realm, courts defer to legislative
judgment, as long as there is a rational basis for the act.' 46
The fundamental rights protected under the Due Process Clause are
closely guarded and the Court has been reluctant to expand these rights
beyond their already limited contexts.147 Language minority plaintiffs
should nonetheless evaluate their claims carefully for any implicated
rights that might be covered by those currently identified by the Court.
In other words, it is at least theoretically possible for a plaintiff to assert a
new right within a right already acknowledged by the Court.' 4 1
fundamental rights violations requires that state provide compelling reason for act and
show that it has chosen least restrictive means of achieving that purpose); see also Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting joint tenancy of extended family members); cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-56
(acknowledging strict scrutiny standard calls for "compelling interests," but requiring
showing of only "important interests" for abortion regulation). Since Roe, the Court has
developed a more deferential, "middle-tier" standard for state limitations on abortion
which requires only that the state not place an "undue burden" on the right. Casey v.
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992). See generally Valerie J. Pacer, Note,
Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard-Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard
and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 295 (1995) (describing "undue
burden" standard).
146. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (stating that Court will not
overturn economic or social regulations that it merely finds unwise); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (holding that state law licensing optometrists and
opthamologists need merely be rational to be upheld); G. Sidney Buchaman, A Very Ra-
tional Court, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1509, 1524 (1993) (comparing strict scrutiny given to claims
implicating privacy rights with lenient scrutiny given to claims implicating economic
rights).
147. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (holding that Constitution provides no right to en-
gage in homosexual acts and asserting that Court must be reluctant to identify new rights
without explicit constitutional support); J. Skelly Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (1980) (declaring that "the Court's
long love affair with substantive due process is past"). But see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1027 (1979) (referring to
"pretended death" of substantive due process).
148. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating, "Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be
read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them"); Law-
rence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorb, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (reasoning that "the more abstractly one states the already-
protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its protec-
tion"). But cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (dictum) (noting that
excessively general language can support undue expansion of rights and advocating that
Court recognize new right only when right falls within specific historical traditions); Ira C.
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MtCH. L. REV. 981, 1035




C. Affirmative Duties?: Protecting the Rights
Part of the Court's unwillingness to acknowledge new fundamental
rights is its reluctance to require affirmative protection of rights by
states. 149 There is a prevailing belief that the rights guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause are 'negative rights,' meaning that the state must
merely avoid impinging on those rights rather than taking affirmative ac-
tion to secure them. 5 ° In Carmona v. Sheffield, 5' for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sending
English-language notice that unemployment benefits will be denied to
monolingual Spanish speakers is "reasonable" for procedural due process
purposes, because no comparatively easy means existed for sending
notification. 52
149. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201
(1989) (stating that Constitution protects negative rights and does not impose affirmative
duties on state). Plaintiffs fare better when merely claiming discrimination rather than
making affirmative demands on state. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 581 (10th Cir.
1980) (holding that, absent reasonable justification, Colorado prison could not refuse to
deliver mail in languages other than English); cf Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the
Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157,
165 (1985) (stating that Meyer v. Nebraska invalidated proscription of instruction in foreign
language, but created no affirmative right to foreign language instruction).
150. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201; Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.
1983); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (holding that Due Process
Clause makes no affirmative requirement for state prison to protect prisoners from bodily
injury caused by other prisoners); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 864, 864-65 (1986) (stating that Due Process Clause serves as
prohibition on impingement of rights, not affirmative mandate to protect them); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of
the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 409-10 (1990) (reporting common view that Due
Process Clause in particular provides only "negative rights"). Many rights, of course, carry
with them an affirmative burden. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99 (listing rights to be
affirmatively protected when state has custody of individual, including right to medical care
and services to protect health and safety); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A
Critique, 88 MicH. L. REv. 2271, 2282-83 (1990) (asserting that free speech, protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and freedom from self-incrimination have all
demanded protective affirmative action by government).
151. 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973).
152. Carmona, 475 F.2d at 739; see also Hun Jong Kim v. United States, 822 F. Supp.
107, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that courts are "loath to find a requirement under due
process guarantees that notices to participants in government benefit programs must be
written in languages in addition to English"); Vialez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 783 F.
Supp. 109, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating due process does not require that notice of tenancy
termination be given in Spanish); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 833 (Cal. 1973)
(holding due process does not require notice of termination of welfare payments to be
given in Spanish), cert. denied sub nom. Guerrero v. Swoap, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); Com-
monwealth v. Olivo, 337 N.E.2d 904, 908-09 (Mass. 1975) (finding no due process right to
eviction notice in Spanish). According to the United States Supreme Court, due process
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Nonetheless, had Mr. Flores been successful in asserting a fundamental
right, such a result may have placed an affirmative duty on the state to
provide him an interpreter at rehabilitation. This is not a novel concept.
Indeed, there is precedent for the provision of interpreters in the criminal
justice system, although not always as a due process entitlement and not
at all stages of the criminal process. 153
The United States Supreme Court has ruled only once on a constitu-
tional requirement to provide an interpreter. In Perovich v. United
States,154 the Court summarily held, without any constitutional analysis,
that the decision to provide interpreters should be made solely at the trial
court's discretion. 15 5 While several lower courts later found both Due
Process and Confrontation Clause mandates for court interpreters, 56
requires that notice be "reasonably calculated" to inform all parties of the pending pro-
ceeding and afford the parties an opportunity to respond. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Charles F. Adams, Comment, "Citado
A Comparacer:" Language Barriers and Due Process-Is Mailed Notice in English Consti-
tutionally Sufficient?, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1395 passim (1973) (arguing right of access to courts
mandates notice in recipient's known language); Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process
and Bilingual Notice, 83 YALE L.J. 385 passim (1973) (arguing that due process requires
notice in known language where economically feasible).
153. Courts have identified four basic sources entitling criminal defendants access to
interpreters. First, the Federal Court Interpreters Act provides for the use of interpreters
in federal courts for parties and witnesses who do not speak English. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1827(d)(1) (1994); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 28 (authorizing courts to appoint interpret-
ers of their own selection, either at state's or one or both parties' expense). Second, some
state statutes or constitutional provisions ensure access to interpreters. See TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.022-21.023 (Vernon 1996) (providing for interpreters as
judge deems necessary). Third, the Due Process Clause guarantees interpreters in some
instances. See United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging
due process interest in interpreter), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United States ex. rel.
Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding defendant had due process
interest in interpreter); see also Williamson B.C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo, Interpreters
for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-English-Speaking Defendant, 63 CAL. L. REV.
801, 802 (1975) (providing impetus in California courts for right to interpreters at trial).
Finally, the Confrontation Clause guarantees indigent criminal defendants access to an in-
terpreter. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (acknowledging
right to interpreter under Confrontation Clause when defendant is indigent).
154. 205 U.S. 86 (1907).
155. Perovich, 205 U.S. at 91.
156. See United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding right to
court interpreter in Fifth Amendment); Negron, 434 F.2d at 389 (locating right to inter-
preter within due process protections); United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F.
Supp. 676, 681 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (noting that courts usually rest constitutional right to
interpreter on due process or confrontation rights); State v. Faafiti, 513 P.2d 697, 699 (Haw.
1973) (stating due process protects right to interpreter); Garcia v. State, 210 S.W.2d 574,
581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) (affirming decision granting constitutional right to interpreter
based on right to hear testimony at trial). But see State v. Neave, 344 N.W.2d 181, 184
(Wis. 1984) (holding that, as matter of "judicial administration," defendant is entitled to
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these mandates are not absolute and may be limited by the courts' find-
ings that the language difficulty is not serious. 157 In addition, trial trans-
lation need not be continuous, 158 and the right to an interpreter can be
waived if not requested. 159 While Congress has supplemented the consti-
tutional protections with the Federal Court Interpreters Act,'6° the courts
have limited this statute in many of the same ways that they have limited
interpreter, but explicitly refusing to identify federal constitutional right). In most jurisdic-
tions, there is no right to an interpreter at state expense where the defendant is not found
to be indigent. See United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 901-03 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding
that where defendant can afford his or her own interpreter, it is not reversible error to fail
to appoint one), affd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). But see Joan B. Safford, No Comprendo: The
Non-English-Speaking Defendant and the Criminal Process, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 15, 27 (1977) (observing that in Fifth and Ninth Circuits and Puerto Rico, interpreters
are available whether or not defendant is indigent). Defendants may also be required to
share interpreters. See Chavira Gonzales v. United States, 314 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1963)
(rejecting assertion that defendant who shared interpreter with another defendant was
"unduly hampered" by not having own interpreter).
157. See United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.2d 205, 206 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that
interpreter was not necessary in defendant's second trial after defendant admitted that he
understood everything in his first trial); Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir.
1962) (finding that interpreter was not needed for Cuban defendant who had sufficient
command of English language); Pietrzak v. United States, 188 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1951)
(determining that lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing interpreter); see also
United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1456 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "'[als a constitu-
tional matter, the appointment of interpreters is within the district court's discretion"')
(quoting United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1141 (11th Cir. 1988)).
158. See United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that "oc-
casional lapses" in interpretation do not violate constitutional protection); Valladares v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding summary translation adequate,
especially when defendant did not object); People v. Rodriguez, 728 P.2d 202, 208 (Cal.
1986) (holding no reversible error where material interruption in translation is not shown
to be harmful); Connecticut v. Munoz, 659 A.2d 683, 697 (Conn. 1995) (stating that, under
facts of case, defendant who had limited understanding of English and who was repre-
sented by same attorney at probable cause hearing and trial is not entitled to separate,
continuous translation at probable cause hearing); see also Chavez v. Indiana, 534 N.E.2d
731, 736 (Ind. 1989) (ruling that simultaneous translation is not required at joinder hearing
for non-English speaking defendant). But see Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14 (implying that consti-
tutional right to interpreter may exist even where defendant can speak some English).
159. See United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
objections to provision of non-certified interpreter can be waived); United States v. Yee
Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding defendant waived right to interpreter
by not objecting); Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1309 (stating defendant waived objection to lapses in
continuous interpretation by failing to object).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1994) (providing for use of interpreters in federal trials at
court's discretion). This statute creates a federal program providing for the use of certified
interpreters and leaves it to judicial discretion to determine when a party or witness
"speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language." Id.
§ 1827(d)(1)(a). Texas provides for the granting of an interpreter on the motion of any
party or of the court, when it is determined that the defendant or a witness cannot speak
1996]
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:149
constitutional rulings mandating protections. 161 Outside this limited and
somewhat unreliable provision for interpreters at "critical phases"'162 of
court proceedings, language minority defendants are generally not enti-
tled to interpreters. 63
V. THE FLORES DECISION
Clearly, the Fourteenth Amendment deck was stacked against Mr. Flo-
res as he asserted his claims in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Be-
cause he could assert no claim to an already acknowledged fundamental
right, he faced the nearly insurmountable obstacle of court unwillingness
to extend due process protections. Further, in order to successfully assert
an equal protection claim, he could be required to establish a nexus be-
tween discrimination based on his language and discrimination against his
race.
Believing that such a nexus existed in his case, Mr. Flores asserted that
the lower court's refusal to provide rehabilitative services in Spanish had
a disproportionate adverse effect on Latinos, a suspect classification for
equal protection purposes.' 64 However, the plurality held that Mr. Flo-
res's inability to speak English did not place him within a classification
and understand English. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.30 (Vernon 1979 & Supp.
1996). There is no indigency requirement. Id.
161. See Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1565-66 (stating that Court Interpreters Act places
duty on courts to ask about need for interpreter, but that interpretation need not be con-
tinuous). According to Valladares, the ultimate question to be asked is "whether any inad-
equacy in the interpretation 'made the trial fundamentally unfair."' Id. at 1566 (quoting
United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Sanchez, 928 F.2d at
1455 (finding it permissible for multiple defendants to share interpreter if each has time to
confer with counsel); cf Joshi, 896 F.2d at 1309 (stating Court Interpreters Act does not
create constitutional rights).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1), (j) (1994) (setting parameters of protection to include
pretrial, trial, and grand jury proceedings).
163. See Quiroz v. Wawrzaszek, 749 F.2d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding no inef-
fective assistance of counsel where defense attorneys communicated potential sentence
ranges to non-English-speaking defendant through combination of sign language, English,
and drawings), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Adams v.
Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1992); Rivera v. Granucci, No. N-87-480 (JAC), 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3264, at *17-18 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1993) (holding due process does not
require interpreter at arrest even where local ethnic concentration is high, although failure
to give Miranda warnings so that suspect understands them may render any statement
inadmissible). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4351 (1984) (providing for interpreters prior
to interrogation for persons whose primary language is not English).
164. Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996). The Supreme Court previously found that Latinos warranted
suspect classification status for equal protection purposes. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 479-80 (1954).
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based on race or national origin. 165 The court noted that language ability
was not an immutable characteristic that merited a suspect classification
and, thus, the court's most searching review. 166 Also, the court found no
nexus between race and language because general classifications based on
language do not involve discrimination against a particular race, and,
therefore, have no nexus with race or national origin. 1 67 Additionally,
the court noted that where an otherwise neutral law is claimed to have a
disproportionate impact on a suspect class, the Supreme Court and Texas
courts have required that the plaintiff show a discriminatory purpose be-
hind the action. 168
In addition to rejecting Flores's equal protection challenge, the court
rejected his contention that the lower court had violated his due process
rights by denying him probation. 169 The Flores court held that probation
did not qualify as a fundamental right because it is given solely at the
discretion of the trial court and is, therefore, not included among the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses, or by any parallel provisions in the Texas
Constitution. 70
165. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (stating that language does not warrant suspect
classification because it is not same as race or national origin).
166. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130. When a state actor discriminates against a suspect
group, the justification for the act or legislation must be compelling, and the action must be
narrowly tailored to meet the stated need. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982);
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On
Discriminating, Unwittingly and Otherwise, 64 TEMP L. REv. 937, 938 (1991) (claiming that
courts apply strict scrutiny to suspect classifications to compensate for inadequate access to
political process).
167. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130-31.
168. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130; see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (noting discrimination
is unlawful under equal protection analysis only if purposeful); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating disproportionate impact alone does not invalidate facially
neutral act). But see Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of
Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761, 763 & n.8 (calling some traits,
such as language or pregnancy, "super-correlated" to suspect or quasi-suspect classes and
arguing that these traits may deserve special scrutiny, even without showing of discrimina-
tory intent).
169. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130.
170. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130. In addition, the court found no protection for lan-
guage rights in the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, noting only that Mr. Flores presented
no evidence to support his claim that the amendment provides greater protection to minor-
ities than either the federal constitution or other state constitutional provisions. Flores,
904 S.W.2d at 130-31. The court noted that Mr. Flores provided no evidence that the
framers of the amendment intended such a reading. Id. But see id. at 132 (Clinton, J.,
dissenting) (observing that Texas Equal Rights Amendment is "self-operative"); Josd Ro-
berto Judrez, Jr., The American Tradition of Language Rights: The Forgotten Right of Gov-
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Finding no suspect classification or fundamental right at issue, the
Court of Criminal Appeals applied a minimal standard of review and held
that refusing to consider Mr. Flores for probation was rationally related
to the trial court's stated goal of ensuring meaningful rehabilitation.' 7 ' In
so holding, the court invoked a "parade of horribles," stating that an op-
posite holding would require states to set up rehabilitation programs in
"many different" languages or to provide probationers with probation of-
ficers who speak their language. 1
72
Judge Meyers, concurring, noted that while language did not "raise a
presumption" of discrimination based on race, a showing that such dis-
crimination merely served as a pretext for racial animus would result in a
reversal of the conviction.173 Judge White also concurred, but did not
publish an opinion.' 74 Judge Clinton, dissenting, wrote that the Texas
equal protection provision 175 protects individuals against discrimination
eminent in a "Known Tongue," 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 443, 626 (1995) (arguing that Texas
Equal Rights Amendment provides strong basis for expanding protections beyond those of
federal Constitution). Although beyond the scope of this Comment, an argument that the
Texas history and constitution provide broad protections for language minorities is a solid
one. For an exhaustive study, see Josd Roberto Ju~rez, Jr., The American Tradition of
Language Rights: The Forgotten Right to Government in a "Known Tongue," 13 LAW &
INEO. J. 443 (1995). Of course, a state constitution may provide more protection than the
federal Constitution. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
(expanding Article 1, § 9 protections of Texas Constitution beyond Fourth Amendment
protections of U.S. Constitution); Johnson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 708, 720-23 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1993) (noting that state constitution is separate from and not dependent upon fed-
eral Constitution, but nonetheless adopting federal definition of "seizure"), affd, 912
S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (observing that
"[s]tate constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often ex-
tending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law");
Erica B. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66 (1974) (noting that states could, under their own constitu-
tions, offer broader guarantees of bilingual education than federal government). Texas
courts determine whether there should be expanded protections by evaluating the intent of
the state constitution's framers and voters keeping in mind the goals the relevant constitu-
tional provision is designed to accomplish. James C. Harrington, Framing a Texas Bill of
Rights Argument, 24 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 399, 411 (1993).
171. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130-31.
172. Id. at 131. The court concluded that such an imposition should come from the
legislative branch rather than the judicial branch. Id.
173. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131 (Meyers, J., concurring). Judge Meyers suggested that
if the record showed that the trial judge routinely denied probation to Latinos who could
speak English, then he would reverse the conviction based on racial discrimination
grounds. Id.
174. Id. (White, J., concurring).
175. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
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based on national origin and that this protection is broad enough to en-
compass ethnic traits such as language.
17 6
Judge Overstreet, joined by Judges Baird and Maloney,177 wrote a
lengthy dissent in which he carefully analyzed each of Mr. Flores's claims
and their legal bases. 178 In concluding that Mr. Flores had been denied a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, Judge Overstreet noted
that Texas has acknowledged a convicted individual's right to considera-
tion of the entire array of punishments available.' 79 According to Judge
Overstreet, a refusal to consider that array on the basis of language
amounted to a due process deprivation. 8 ° In addition, Judge Overstreet
wrote that language is a characteristic that may identify a person as a
member of a suspect group.' 8 ' Judge Overstreet found that the trial
judge had denied Mr. Flores probation in part because of Mr. Flores's
cultural heritage.' 82 Thus, in Judge Overstreet's opinion, the decision to
deny Mr. Flores probation merited strict scrutiny. 83 Furthermore, the
decision could not survive strict scrutiny because other options were
available to the trial court to meet its stated goal of effective rehabilita-
tion.'" For example, the trial court could have sent Mr. Flores to the
Spanish-language rehabilitation provided by the State of Texas, or the
court could have appointed an interpreter for rehabilitation, as it had at
trial. 85
Judge Overstreet's arguments did not prevail. Instead, the court held
that, absent an implicated fundamental right or suspect classification,
neither the county nor the trial court was obligated to provide rehabilita-
tion services in Spanish. 86 However, this conclusion was not inevitable;
the Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution forbids interpret-
ers.187 Indeed, none of the plurality's conclusions based on the Four-
176. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 132 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
177. Judge Maloney joined the dissent but noted that, under the facts presented in
Flores, language had served as a surrogate for race. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 139 (Maloney, J.,
dissenting).
178. See id. at 132-39 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (providing detailed analysis of Four-
teenth Amendment claims). In sharp contrast, the plurality opinion resolved all the Four-
teenth Amendment issues in three paragraphs. Id. at 130-31.
179. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 135 (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 137.
182. Id.
183. Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 137 (Overstreet, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 138.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 131.
187. See Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907) (stating that appointment of
court interpreters is discretionary).
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teenth Amendment were inevitable.' s They can only be justified by a
mechanical application of Fourteenth Amendment principles.18 9
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR A LESS FORMALISTIC READING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Equal Protection: Remembering What Makes a Group Suspect
A mechanical, formalistic approach to Fourteenth Amendment inter-
pretation is exemplified by equal protection cases involving language-mi-
nority claims. In these cases, courts have required language minorities to
invoke the talismans of race and national origin at an impossible level of
specificity in order to succeed. 190 However, requiring language-minority
plaintiffs to show that language-based discrimination is a pretext for dis-
crimination based on race or national origin misses the point.' 9' This
nexus requirement allows states to discriminate on a defining characteris-
188. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212-13
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment decisions are not
inevitable, because precedent may be viewed from broad or narrow perspective, as one
chooses).
189. Cf. Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (disposing summarily
of language discrimination claim by stating that "[w]e are not dealing here with a suspect
nationality or race"); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (deciding,
within one-page decision, that California's decision to deal only in English was reasonable
and not violative of Fourteenth Amendment). These two examples demonstrate a
mechanical application of Fourteenth Amendment principles.
190. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
language-based discrimination improper only because discrimination was against specific
languages and thus could be seen as directed at race or national origin), vacated as moot,
484 U.S. 806 (1987); Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306 (D.P.R. 1992) (stating
language discrimination merits heightened scrutiny where it is directed at particular race or
national origin group, but suggesting quasi-suspect classification in other cases); Pabon v.
McIntosh, 546 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding general language discrimination
is not race-based); see also Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the
Equal Protection Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L.
REv. 481, 490 (1994) (arguing that language discrimination should only be given height-
ened scrutiny if state actions "mandate special treatment for particular language groups").
191. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REv. 885, 901 (1986) (advocating abandonment of national origin "pigeonhole"
and replacing it with protection of right to view world through individual cultures and not
to be refused fundamental right based on language ability). Piatt's suggestion involves
three proposals. Id. at 902. First, where an individual, because of language barrier, is de-
nied the exercise of a fundamental right or access to a basic human need, society would
allow "limited official bilingualism." Id. Second, where circumstances require communica-
tion in one language, such as when safety is at risk, society would recognize "limited official
monolingualism." Id. Third, in all other areas,.courts would protect the right to use one's
language of choice. Id.
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tic of race or national origin without a compelling justification.'92 While
language does not equal race or national origin, it is a subset of these
classifications.' 93 Language is a reflection of origin, 94 an index of other-
ness,195 and can, by itself, serve as a locus of oppression. 196 Further, no
problem associated with belonging to a minority is not shared by a minor-
ity who cannot speak English. In fact, these individuals, isolated from the
political, social, and commercial life of the English-speaking majority, are
arguably more insulated, more oppressed, and less able to find political
representation than their English-speaking counterparts. 97 When these
individuals fail to prove that language discrimination serves as a pretext
for racial or national origin discrimination, courts find themselves in the
192. Cf Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic
Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761, 763-64 & n.8 (arguing that language is
"super-correlated" to race); Recent Case, Peremptory Challenges-Third Circuit Holds
That Peremptory Challenges Based on Foreign Language Ability Do Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause, 108 HARV. L. REV. 769, 772 n.34 (1995) (analogizing logic of allowing
discrimination on basis of language to allowing discrimination based on skin color).
193. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. But see Pabon, 546 F. Supp. at
1340 (finding no suspect classification implicated in prisoner's claim that prison violated
Fourteenth Amendment by not providing classes in Spanish, because failure to provide
classes affected anyone who did not speak English, regardless of national origin); Flores v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (stating that Spanish-speaking
persons have various nations of origin and should not be treated as single group), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996).
194. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885, 896 (1986) (stating that language and culture are "inseparably
interrelated").
195. See Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 159 (1985) (noting history of
prejudice against all people viewed by dominant group as "different").
196. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (noting that "language
elicits a response from others" that can range from respect to scorn); Flores, 904 S.W.2d at
132 n.1 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (stating that inappropriate discrimination in Flores case
was based on fact that Mr. Flores did not speak English, not on any particular national
origin); see also DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LAN-
GUAGE FOR AMERICANS? 1 (1990) (stating that non-English speakers may be regarded by
some as not only un-American, but "sub-human"). As an example of blind linguistic preju-
dice, in 1904 a railroad president said of some of his workers, "These workers don't suf-
fer-they don't even speak English." Daniel Shanahan, We Need a Nationwide Effort to
Encourage, Enhance, and Expand our Students' Proficiency in Language, CHRON. OF
HIGHER ED., May 31, 1989, at A40.
197. See Benitez, 806 F. Supp. at 305 (stating that language minorities are "vulnerable
to majoritarian politics"); cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
472-73 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that insularity can mean "social and
cultural" isolation as well as political isolation).
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odd position of tacitly approving even unnecessary and wasteful discrimi-
nation against a historically oppressed ethnic minority. 198
However, such tacit approval may not be necessary where the presence
of high concentrations of language minorities would seem to demand ac-
commodation. 199 That Mr. Flores lived in Texas, where one-quarter of
the population is Latino,z°° should be relevant to his equal protection
claim. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court made it clear that courts can
consider the demographic context of language discrimination in deter-
mining whether to apply strict scrutiny.2z ' In an area with relatively high
proportions of individuals who speak a particular minority language,
states should be expected to provide services in that language. 0° Fur-
ther, if plaintiffs can demonstrate historical discrimination against the im-
plicated minority, courts should afford the most careful scrutiny to their
claims.20 3 On the other hand, if a language minority plaintiff spoke a
more exotic and rare language, and that language minority did not have a
history of discrimination in that state, a sentencing court may argue that,
after exhausting all reasonable means of procuring an interpreter, it was
198. See Asian Am. Bus. Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (stating that facial language discrimination necessarily establishes national origin dis-
crimination because otherwise, state actors could avoid strict scrutiny by merely passing
acts that discriminate on basis of language rather than race or national origin).
199. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (stating that size of minority group in community
may bear on whether discrimination based on that minority's language is unconstitutional);
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1926) (finding size of Chinese community
in Philippines important factor in its discrimination analysis); Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 137
(Overstreet, J., dissenting) (relying on Hernandez discussion of relevance of demography
to language-minority's constitutional claim to argue that Mr. Flores's equal protection
rights were violated).
200. Ronald Brownstein, Two States of Progress for Latinos: For Minorities in Politics,
Texas and California Are Worlds Apart; Demographic Patterns Are Part of the Explanation,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at Al. Thirty-seven of the 254 counties in Texas have more than
2,000 people who speak only Spanish. Sylvia Moreno, PUC to Propose Bilingual Mandate
for Many Utilities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 21, 1994, at All.
201. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (stating that in some communities with concen-
trations of ethnic residents, language discrimination should be seen as pretext for race
discrimination).
202. See Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 842 (Cal. 1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting)
(arguing that providing notice in language represented by large percentages of population
would not necessarily mean having to provide notice in rare languages), cert. denied sub
nom. Guerrero v. Swoap, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974).
203. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982) (naming groups that are likely to
reflect prejudice as deserving of strict scrutiny for equal protection); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (listing susceptibility to prejudice as factor in
determining whether group classification merits strict scrutiny); see also Mark Strasser,
Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 939 (1991) (stating whether or not group has suffered historical
discrimination is relevant in determining if it will be classified as suspect).
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unable to do SO. 2 0 4 Thus, the recognition of a significant language minor-
ity as a suspect class should still permit unavoidable or necessary
discrimination.
Because language is so intimate a reflection of origin,2°5 recognition of
language as a suspect classification is warranted.2 °6 When a state wishes
to discriminate against a language minority, it should be required to put
forth a compelling reason for such discrimination.20 7 Further, the state
204. See Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 842-43 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (asserting that provid-
ing notice to California's Spanish-speaking residents would not obligate state to provide
notice in exotic languages such as Basque or Chippewa, because such obligation would be
unreasonable when so few residents speak those languages); see also Flores, 904 S.W.2d at
138 (Overstreet, J. dissenting) (noting that interpreter had been provided to Mr. Flores at
trial and could have been provided for rehabilitation). However, in the absence of an
interpreter, the most appropriate remedy for Mr. Flores on a successful appeal might have
been probation without rehabilitation. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 139 n.5 (Overstreet, J.,
dissenting) (stating that, although there is no right to probation, appropriate remedy for
discriminatory denial might have been probated sentence).
205. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (referring to language as means of defining self);
Asian Am. Bus. Group, 716 F. Supp. at 1330 (stating that language flows from national
origin); Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 136 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (calling language "but one
characteristic that may distinguish a person as a member of a suspect class"); Recent Case,
Peremptory Challenges- Third Circuit Holds That Peremptory Challenges Based on For-
eign Language Ability Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause, 108 HARV. L. REV. 769,
772 (1995) (calling language ability "an integral manifestation of ethnicity").
206. See Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Serv-
ices in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1987) (arguing that language minorities
possess nearly all indicia of suspectness, but suggesting they be classified as "quasi-sus-
pect"). Mutability is often the most contested trait. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (Over-
street, J., dissenting) (claiming that people can choose freely what language they will
speak); Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in
the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1354-55 (1987) (noting difficulty in analyzing mutabil-
ity). However, statements that language handicaps are easy or even possible to overcome
for adults have been controverted. See Benitez, 806 F. Supp. at 306 (stating that some
aspects of language are immutable: even after English is learned, accents, surnames and
patterns of behavior remain); Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 136 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (stating
that for monolingual non-English speakers, language may be immutable trait); cf. Martha
Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education,
48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 203 (1985) (stating that equality principle which ignores
relevant differences wrongly obscures society's responsibility to "relate across differ-
ences"); Williamson B.C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo, Comment, Interpreters for the De-
fense: Due Process for the Non-English-Speaking Defendant, 63 CAL. L. REV. 801, 805
(1975) (arguing that even when victims of discrimination can remedy "offensive" trait,
state must bear responsibility for discrimination).
207. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. But cf Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compel-
ling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917, 969-70 (1988) (arguing that government interests are as
subjectively defined as fundamental rights and therefore are as difficult to identify). Cer-
tainly, public safety would be a valid purpose, where legitimately implicated. See United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (stating that government's interest in safety can
19961
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should be required to demonstrate that it had considered alternatives to
the discriminatory act.2" 8 In states where language minorities make up
significant percentages of the population, and historical discrimination
against those minorities is present, the state should carry the heavy bur-
den of demonstrating that it took the only action necessary to achieve an
urgent purpose.2 °9
B. Fundamental Rights: Knowing Them When We See Them
Current due process analysis is of no more help to language minorities
than the mechanically applied Equal Protection Clause.210 In protesting
a state action under the Due Process Clause, language minorities must
first locate their putative rights within a guarded set of due process funda-
mental rights.211 In Mr. Flores's case, two potential liberty rights are
most at stake: 1) his right to fair criminal proceedings 212 and 2) his right
to choose, with impunity, the language he will speak.213
outweigh individual's interest in liberty); see also Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition
of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885, 902 (1986) (claiming that safety may
be compelling reason for "limited official monolingualism" in some cases).
208. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 138 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (noting alternatives
available to sentencing court in Flores: state program with Spanish interpreters, county
provision for interpreters, and use of trial interpreter at rehabilitation); see also Thongvanh
v. Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding prison policy of refusing mail in Lao
language violated equal protection because reasonable alternatives were available to en-
sure prison security); Recent Case, Peremptory Challenges-Third Circuit Holds That Per-
emptory Challenges Based on Foreign Language Ability Do Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause, 108 HARV. L. REV. 769, 773-74 (1995) (arguing that availability of less
discriminatory alternatives to language-based juror discrimination should invalidate exclu-
sion of language minorities).
209. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Court
must be especially vigilant when it reviews discrimination involving groups who have been
historically disadvantaged).
210. See Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993) (stating that Court should exer-
cise judicial restraint in identifying new due process rights); Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157,
167 (4th Cir. 1994) (relying on Supreme Court's unwillingness to identify new substantive
due process rights to reject claim that maintaining unsubstantiated child abuse investiga-
tive reports violates due process), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.
Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988) (noting Supreme Court's reluctance to identify new privacy
rights).
211. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correction Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979) (noting that initial question in due process claim is nature of asserted interest); see
also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487 (1980) (stating that threshold issue of due process
claim by mental hospital prisoner was whether liberty interest was at stake).
212. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670 (1983) (finding state could not revoke
probation on basis of indigency alone); United States ex. rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d
386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding constitutional right to interpreter during trial).
213. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885 passim (1986) (advocating constitutional protection for choice of lan-
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The latter right may be the most difficult for language minorities to
assert. While the claim of a protected right to monolingualism may be
attractive, no court has addressed it.214 The Supreme Court came closest
to recognizing rights based on language choice in Meyer v. Nebraska,215
but however promising that decision appeared to be, it is nonetheless a
decision that arguably based its holding on the right to choose an occupa-
tion and one's child's education.216 In addition, given its hesitancy to
identify any new rights at all, the Court is unlikely to expand fundamental
rights to include monolingualism.21 7
However, identifying a right to one's language and culture does not
seem unreasonable.218 Such a right might be included in the right to free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment or any other relevant
protection provided by the Bill of Rights and incorporated against the
guage); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that Court has recognized privacy interest for decisions that should be left to indi-
viduals to make).
214. See Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom to Speak One Language: Free Speech and the
English Language Amendment, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 35, 41 (1991) (stating that
there is no right to speak one's choice of language in United States). But see Bill Piatt,
Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885,
885-86 (1986) (arguing that Meyer, Yu Cong Eng, and other cases support existence of
right to language choice).
215. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
216. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. But see William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v.
Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 185-86 (1988) (arguing that
Meyer impliedly expanded personal liberty and substantive due process rights).
217. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (dictum) (implying
that Court should be reluctant to identify new fundamental rights); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194
(stating that Court was not inclined to identify new fundamental rights in Due Process
Clause without explicit constitutional authority).
218. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885, 891-92 (1986) (supporting right to language, but noting it has not been
acknowledged in workplace, civil proceedings, notice of termination, or notice of reduction
of services or benefits); Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old
Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 250 (1990) (stating, "[iut is frightening to think that be-
cause something is a discretionary benefit in the first place, its denial on any grounds or in
any circumstance has no constitutional significance"); Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't
Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 690, 736 (1995) (positing that Constitution permits language minorities to
participate in public life and maintain ties to culture). But see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1040-42 (1979) (arguing new
rights should be acknowledged only if American institutions have historically recognized
claim as highly important and contemporary society values liberty). The flaw in this ap-
proach, of course, is that a liberty interest with institutional and popular support is proba-
bly amply protected, while a liberty interest attributed to a group that has been
traditionally discriminated against might garner little popular support.
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states through the Fourteenth Amendment,219 or it might be identified as
a liberty or privacy interest under substantive due process analysis.22° In
Bowers v. Hardwick,2 21 the Supreme Court stated that substantive due
process rights are either explicit or implicit in the Constitution and are
supported by an arguably specific level of tradition.222 Certainly implicit
in the Constitution's wide array of guaranteed freedoms is the right to
choose or maintain one's identity.223 This right is reflected in the First
Amendment guarantees of the free exercise of religion and speech, as
well as the right of free association.224 Language tolerance and protec-
tion is supported by a long tradition of coexistence between diverse cul-
tures and their attendant traits.225 This tradition, and the implicit right to
choose one's identity, support an argument that language should be a
protected right. Further, the creation of this protected right should place
upon states an affirmative duty to accommodate monolingual language
minorities through the provision of interpreters and meaningful notice of
the denial of state services.22 6
219. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
220. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885 passim (1986) (arguing for constitutional right to language).
221. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
222. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
223. Cf id. at 203-04 (stating that Court has recognized privacy interests where deci-
sions belonging to individuals are implicated).
224. See Bill 0. Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial
Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 880-81 (1993) (arguing that promoting one's ethnicity is
consistent with constitutional principles).
225. See Dennis Baron, Federal English (noting official tolerance of other languages in
early United States history), in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFI-
CIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 36, 37 (James Crawford ed., 1992); Shirley B. Heath, Why
No Official Tongue? (stating use of languages other than English was encouraged in early
United States), in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH
CONTROVERSY 20, 22 (James Crawford ed., 1992).
226. Cf Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 438 (1990) (noting agree-
ment among diverse commentators that Fourteenth Amendment is powerful source of af-
firmative duties); Bill Piatt, Toward Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous.
L. REV. 885, 902 (1986) (stating where important benefits or services are at stake, society
should acknowledge "official bilingualism"); Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process and
Bilingual Notice, 83 YALE L.J. 385 passim (1973) (maintaining that notice in known lan-
guage should be available whenever feasible). State inaction is, of course, a sort of action,
with its own significance and results. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (complaining that Court deci-
sions draw artificial line between action and inaction); Susan Bandes, The Negative Consti-
tution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2280 (1990) (arguing distinction between action
and inaction cannot justify current view of Constitution as protecting only negative liber-
ties). But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (stating that liberty interest
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However, an expansion of current substantive due process rights to in-
clude protection for language is not likely to occur under the present
Supreme Court.227 Thus, an argument in support of a fundamental right
to a fair outcome in criminal proceedings, the second potential right im-
plicated in Flores, may be somewhat more reliable. This approach may
provide an indirect way for language minorities to prevail, as courts are
less likely to balk at finding other already-identified rights implicated in a
language minority's claim.228 The Flores court might have found that this
right to fair criminal proceedings includes a right to meaningful rehabili-
tation, or, alternatively, a right to probation.
There is, however, an obstacle to finding such a right, as the Flores
plurality noted.2 29 Language minorities claiming that they have been de-
nied a right must make a valid assertion that such a right exists, and that
they are not merely laying claim to a privilege. 23 ° Although sharply criti-
cized,231 the distinction between rights, which are protected by the Con-
stitution, and privileges, which are seen as mere "acts of grace," is deeply
protects individuals from interference with freedom of choice but does not grant entitle-
ment to funds to pay for every choice).
227. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6 (dictum) (arguing that Court should be
reluctant to identify new fundamental rights).
228. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995)
(striking official English amendment on First Amendment grounds), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1316 (1996); Negron, 434 F.2d at 389 (finding right to interpreter under Confrontation
Clause); Gomez v. Myers, 627 F. Supp. 183, 188-89 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (ruling that court must
accept prisoners' civil rights claim in Spanish, on basis of fundamental right of access to
courts).
229. See Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (argu-
ing that probation is privilege granted at state's discretion, not state-created or constitu-
tional right), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple
Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43
VAND. L. REV. 409, 431 (1990) (arguing that nature of state's duty turns on "fundamental
right at stake").
230. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981) (holding
that before individual can claim due process protection, fundamental right, either constitu-
tional or state-created, must exist).
231. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2271, 2278-79 (1990) (calling action/inaction rights distinction "unworkable and mis-
guided" because it reduces government duties to simple "either/or" questions); Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1293, 1310-11 (1984) (arguing that right/privilege distinction is logically flawed
because idea that government may conditionally deny benefit does not logically flow from
idea that it may absolutely deny benefit); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1443-45 (1967)
(noting harsh consequences of doctrine, which include loss of job or profession or exclu-
sion from educational opportunities). But cf David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Con-
stitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (asserting that distinction between
positive and negative rights is correct, but requires principled application).
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entrenched in constitutional law.232 The rationale for the distinction is
painfully logical: if the government has no duty to provide a service or
benefit, then it may use its limited discretion to deny or allocate it.2
33
Of course, a state may not deny or condition even a privilege for an
unconstitutional reason.234 For example, in Bearden v. Georgia,235 the
United States Supreme Court stated that probation may not be revoked
for failure to pay a fine simply because a probationer is indigent.236 Un-
fortunately for Mr. Flores, the Bearden Court explicitly noted that consid-
erations such as indigency may be taken into account before probation is
232. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (stating
that "[tjhe Petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman"); see also Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190 (1967) (defining "act of grace doctrine" as denying ability of
Constitution to limit government's granting of privileges). But see William W. Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439, 1461-62 (1968) (arguing distinction has lost vitality because of increased government
involvement in private lives).
233. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 315-18 (holding that right to abortion placed no duty on
government to fund medically necessary procedures). This idea is based on the premise of
"greater and lesser," which holds that the government may precondition that which it may
deny entirely. Of course, it is not altogether clear that a state could deny probation. Cf
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1313 (1984) (calling doctrine of greater and lesser "flawed"
because it is unclear that government could withhold privileges).
234. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958); see Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2274-75 (1990) (noting assump-
tion that governments may not deny services on unconstitutional premises); Note, Judicial
Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 190 (1967) (observing that "privi-
lege" theory has been replaced with theory of "unconstitutional conditions"). For exam-
ple, it is unassailably true that should a government deny a service or benefit on an
unconstitutional premise-race, for example-the individuals affected would have a valid
constitutional claim (in the case of race, an equal protection claim). See Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989) (defining unconsti-
tutional conditions as notion that "government may not grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold
that benefit altogether"). But see Harris, 448 U.S. at 315-17 (upholding Hyde Amend-
ment, which denied state-funded abortions for indigent women).
235. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
236. See id. at 670-72 (holding that without judicial findings, probationer was respon-
sible for failure to pay fine and that because no adequate alternatives for punishment were
available, state cannot revoke probation for failure to pay fine); see also Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395, 397-401 (1971) (stating that where statute only authorized fine, state could not
imprison indigent defendant for inability to pay); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239-40
(1970) (holding state may not imprison offender beyond time allowed by statute to make
him "work off" fine).
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granted,237 thus affirming the premise that there is no protected interest
in the granting of probation. In addition, Mr. Flores was required to es-
tablish that the denial of a government benefit-probation-on the basis
of language is unconstitutional. 238 If he were denied probation on the
basis of the exercise of his free speech or his religion, or because of his
race, the matter would be simple-recognized fundamental rights protect
citizens from such discrimination.239 Without a right protecting language
choice, however, Mr. Flores could not establish that the denial of proba-
tion on the basis of language was unconstitutional.
Because probation is a privilege,24° courts have traditionally held that
it is an "act of grace" granted to a criminal defendant at the discretion of
237. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670; see also Mayo v. State, 861 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ ref'd) (holding Bearden rule does not apply when
initially determining sentence). But see Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Reha-
bilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 28 (1968) (claiming that
there is little distinction between sentencing and revocation because, in both, judge has
option of sending individual to prison).
238. See Frederick Schauer, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Unifying
Theory?, 72 DENy. U. L. REV. 989, 1001-02 (1995) (noting that unconstitutional conditions
doctrine does not provide substantive rights but instead is "metadoctrine" protecting other
rights). But cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982) (acknowledging that illegal aliens
were not recognized suspect classification for equal protection purposes, and education
was not fundamental right, but still upholding claim that illegal aliens could not be denied
education, because to do so unfairly discriminated against children); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at
629-33 (holding that fundamental right to travel prohibited residency requirements for
receipt of welfare benefits, even though poverty does not merit suspect classification and
subsistence is not deemed fundamental right); see also William W. Van Alstyne, The De-
mise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442
(1968) (stating that when claimants to public sector benefit have not been able to establish
that benefit is fundamental right, courts have found another right on which to uphold their
claim). One commentator has called this the "wealth plus fundamental right" reasoning:
wealth, plus a fundamental right, earns the claimant suspect classification analysis. Ira C.
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1025
(1979).
239. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989) (noting that unconstitutional conditions doctrine protects constitutional
rights).
240. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (stating that no fundamental right to probation has
been identified); see also Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (stating that probation is
act of grace by government to convicted criminal and that probation has no basis in Consti-
tution); Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932) (affirming that probation is act of
grace and not right); People v. Osslo, 323 P.2d 397, 413 (Cal. 1958) (holding that probation
is act of grace granted entirely at discretion of sentencing judge); Fred Cohen, Sentencing,
Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1,
6 (1968) (observing that defendants who are eligible for parole have "no enforceable claim
to it" and that they may not even have "any right to be fully and fairly considered for it");
Edgardo Rotman, Do Criminal Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Rehabilitation?,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1023, 1023 (1986) (noting that federal courts have not
ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:149
241the sentencing court. However, such broad and nearly unreviewable
recognized constitutional right to rehabilitation for criminal offenders); Fred Lautz, Note,
Equal Protection and Revocation of an Indigent's Probation for Failure to Meet Monetary
Conditions: Bearden v. Georgia, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 121, 138 (noting probation is privilege,
not right). Discretionary decisions are often considered to be less vulnerable to allegations
of discrimination. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 368 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting)
(claiming that Fourteenth Amendment protects only civil rights, not political rights; thus,
judge could refuse to seat African-American jurors, because discretionary decisions were
made on basis of merit by those with "elective authority"); Scott v. Village of Kewaskum,
786 F.2d 338, 339 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that no property interest adheres to benefits
granted on discretionary basis).
241. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 561 (1980) (holding that judge may
deny probation based on whether or not defendant cooperated with officials in investiga-
tion); Burns, 287 U.S. at 223 (finding probation is not right but matter of grace by court).
But see Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 849 (1994) (arguing for fundamental right to be free
from incarceration); H. Richmond Fisher, Parole and Probation Procedures After Morris-
sey and Gagnon, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 48 (1974) (stating that "[t]o view
parole or probation as an 'act of grace' is to ignore correctional goals of the penological
system"); Edgardo Rotman, Do Criminal Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Reha-
bilitation?, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1023,1068 (1986) (arguing United States should
protect constitutional right to rehabilitation). The decision whether or not to grant proba-
tion can be limited somewhat by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1994) (stating that of-
fenders must be sentenced to probation according to federal guidelines); id. § 3561 (1994 &
Supp. 1995) (limiting judicial discretion by stating conditions under which federal judges
may grant probation); United States v. Altamirano, 11 F.3d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that court was not permitted to grant probation in lieu of fine where § 3561(a) did not
permit probation). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3561 creates no liberty interest in probation. See
18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1994) (stating that probation may be granted by court). When a statute
promises probation under specific circumstances, a liberty interest may lie. See Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (commenting that states may create liberty interest
if states place "substantive limits on official discretion"); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
466 (1983) (stating liberty interests may arise from Due Process Clause or from state laws);
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (contending that parole statute may create expectancy of re-
lease); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974) (asserting that state laws may
create certain liberty interests to be protected by Due Process Clause); see also Abraham v.
State, 585 P.2d 526, 530 n.12 (Alaska 1978) (citing constitutional provision specifying that
Alaskan goals of penal system are reformation and protection of public); Solari v. Vincent,
363 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding that convicted defendant possesses
"earned right" to parole release when parole board is satisfied that applicant meets statu-
tory criteria for parole), rev'd, 345 N.E.2d 591 (N.Y. 1976); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some
Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 327 (1993) (noting that, in some cases, liberty interests are not constitutionally
created but created by state law). But see Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1995)
(stating that liberty interest in probation will generally arise only where restraint imposes
unusual and significant hardship on prison inmates). The Texas probation statute, article
42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, does not give rise to a liberty interest. See
Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that Texas probation
statute does not create right to probation).
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discretion can be dangerous, as the case of Washington v. McSpadden242
vividly demonstrates. In McSpadden, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals affirmed a trial court's decision to condition a burglary offender's
probation on thirty days' imprisonment.243 The sentencing judge warned
the offender that if he did not respond to his questions with a "yes, sir,"
the court would deny his request for probation and give him thirty days
instead.2 "1 Although the defendant answered "yes, sir" or "no, sir" ap-
proximately twenty times, the judge ordered him to serve thirty days
the first time he failed to do SO. 24 6 Stating that a sentencing judge is given
wide discretion in granting and conditioning probation, the Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to grant the defendant's application for a writ
of mandamus.247
Cases like McSpadden and Flores demonstrate how far judicial discre-
tion allows judges to stray from rational sentencing determinations. Be-
cause the distinction between decisions to grant probation and decisions
to revoke it are blurry and perhaps not always principled, finding a liberty
interest in the decision of whether to grant probation seems reasonable.
Further, because liberty is so fundamental an interest, it should not be
deprived for reasons unrelated to the crime.248 If one has a liberty inter-
est in freedom from incarceration solely because a judge has granted that
freedom, one should have an interest in fair consideration for probation
arising from the state statutes that empower the judge to make that grant.
242. 676 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
243. McSpadden, 676 S.W.2d at 422.
244. Id. at 421-22. The judge said, "Let's have a 'yes, sir,' every time you say 'yes,'
[sic] I want a 'sir' behind it. Do you understand that? Or you are not going to get proba-
tion, if you want probation, you are going to get 30 days. You understand that?" Id.
245. Id. at 422.
246. Id. at 422. The judge issued the sentence with these words, "Please think of me,
Mr. Washington, every single day you spend in jail. Start saying 'sir' to people. You under-
stand that?" Id. The judge further ruled out any possibility of early release for "good
time." Id.
247. McSpadden, 676 S.W.2d at 422. The court noted, however, that because the
judge's decision was not a "[model] of judicial behavior," Mr. Washington may be able to
challenge the action on an appeal of the merits of the case or on collateral attack. Id. at
422 n.2.
248. See Roberts, 445 U.S. at 559 (stating that relevant question in sentencing defend-
ant is whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is relevant to determination of "an appro-
priate sentence"); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.13 § 3(a)(4) (Vernon
1979) (stating probation may be granted when it best serves ends of justice and best inter-
ests of public as well as defendant); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due
Process, Judicial Review and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 322-23
(1993) (stating that substantive due process reflects simple notion that "government must
not be arbitrary"); cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956) (noting that because
indigency bears no rational relationship to guilt or innocence of defendant, it should not be
used to impede defendant's access to appellate review).
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Thus, while judges should be permitted to consider a broad range of fac-
tors in deciding whether to grant probation, 49 they should not be allowed
to abuse their discretion to eviscerate the legislative goals of probation-
to benefit criminal offenders and the society to which they will ultimately
return.25o
As a result, the Flores court might have at least held that a right to
meaningful review of probation applications falls within the right to fair
treatment in the criminal justice system, without going further and finding
a right to probation itself.2 51 Indeed, the procedural protections given in
proceedings granting or revoking probation 252 are meaningless if the sen-
tencing judge is not required to make a principled attempt to arrive at the
best sentence for both the defendant and the public.2 53 In Bearden, the
Supreme Court advised that a decision to place an offender on probation
reflects a "determination by the sentencing court that the State's peno-
logical interests do not require imprisonment., 254 Thus, the sentencing
decision consists of evaluating the "entire background" of the offender to
find the "appropriate sentence for the defendant and crime.,2 55 Unfortu-
nately, the Flores decision appears to ignore these laudable guidelines.
249. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670 (stating that sentencing court can consider defend-
ant's entire background when deciding whether to grant probation).
250. See McSpadden, 676 S.W.2d at 426 (Teague, J., dissenting) (arguing that discre-
tion to grant probation is limited by requirement that decision be rationally related to
"treatment of the probationer and the protection of the public"); see also McClenan v.
State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (holding that judge's refusal to
consider probation where it may have been warranted amounted to violation of due
process).
251. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 138 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (noting that acknowl-
edging such right to fair treatment need not imply substantive right to probation itself),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996). Rather, the right could fall generally within the fair
procedure rights given criminal defendants. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670 (holding that
probation could not be revoked merely because indigent probationer could not pay fines);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (finding right to hearing upon probation
revocation). Such an argument, of course, demonstrates the blurry lines between fair pro-
cedure and substantive rights. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 581-82 n.31 (4th ed. 1991) (describing difficulties in distinguishing procedural
from substantive rights).
252. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661-62 (disallowing revocation of probation based on
inability to pay fines); Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782 (providing right to hearing at probation
revocation); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding probationer has right to
counsel at revocation hearing).
253. See McClenan, 661 S.W.2d at 110 (stating that "a court's arbitrary refusal to con-
sider the entire range of punishment would constitute a denial of due process"); cf. Flores,
904 S.W. at 135 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (noting that jurors are compelled to consider
probation when available to defendant).
254. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670.
255. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
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The sentencing judge did not carefully determine the appropriateness of
probation in Mr. Flores's case.256 Instead, the judge considered only one
factor, language, and considered no alternatives for dealing with it.2
57
The Flores court justified this lack of consideration with the rationale
that Mr. Flores could not benefit from English-language rehabilitation.258
Of course, no one could benefit from rehabilitation in an incomprehensi-
ble foreign language. Nonetheless, that plainly logical fact masks the
court's illogical decision. Instead, the stated goal of meaningful rehabili-
tation would have been more rationally met by accommodating Mr. Flo-
res's language difficulty.259 In fact, Mr. Flores may have benefitted quite
well from rehabilitation provided in his own language.260 Recalcitrance,
an indication that the convicted individual had no intention of benefiting
from rehabilitation, is a better reason for denying a "privilege" that at
least promises to benefit both the individual and society. The sentencing
judge, however, made no allegation that Mr. Flores exhibited such
recalcitrance.261
C. Trusting the Tests
1. Making an Argument for Language Discrimination
The result of Flores and similar cases is that discrimination against a
historically oppressed minority is allowed to stand without sufficient justi-
fication.262 Written primarily to protect one disenfranchised minority,
256. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 137-38 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (stating that lan-
guage ability is not sufficient criteria upon which to base sentencing decision).
257. See id. (noting state's concession that language was only criteria relied upon in
determining sentence).
258. Ia. at 131.
259. See James Harrington, Language Barrier Doesn't Merit Jail Time, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Aug. 7, 1995, at A9 (stating that it would have been more rational to make
attending English classes condition of probation than to put Mr. Flores in jail).
260. Cf. Abraham, 585 P.2d at 531 (stating that Alaskan constitutional goal of refor-
mation benefits rehabilitated offender by enhancing "inherent dignity as a human being").
In Abraham, a sentencing judge denied Abraham, convicted of the assaultive death of his
wife, parole because the offender spoke Yupik, and no alcohol-related rehabilitation was
available in that language. Id. at 532. Based on the state constitution's stated penological
goal of reformation, the Alaskan Supreme Court held that Abraham's request for rehabili-
tation for alcohol abuse entitled him to at least an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 533. The
court stated, "We are confident that the vast resources of this state can in some way be
directed to correct this all too prevalent situation, which we see on a daily basis when the
courts sentence criminal offenders for alcohol-related crimes." Id.
261. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 135 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (noting that only justifi-
cation given for denial of Mr. Flores's probation was defendant's language deficiency).
262. See Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (Over-
street, J., dissenting) (observing that natural outcome of Flores decision will be that anyone
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African-Americans, from abusive state action,263 the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is often used to disenfranchise other minorities, including those who
do not speak English.264 Language minorities are disenfranchised, in
part, because of the courts' mechanical application of tests whose under-
lying purposes seem forgotten.265
These judicial decisions regarding language discrimination often reflect
society's concerns about the demands language minorities might make on
limited government treasuries or, more generally, concerns that minori-
ties should not be encouraged in their failure to learn the "national lan-
guage. ''266  In other words, decisions putatively resting on firm
constitutional principles may in fact rely also on policy arguments and
subjective beliefs about the value of speaking English.267 These policy
arguments deserve serious and critical scrutiny, because they are an inevi-
table part of constitutional interpretation, and also because they play a
in Smith County who does not speak English will be denied probation for DWI offenses),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 716 (1996).
263. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding (noting
that "mischief" to be remedied by Fourteenth Amendment was discrimination against for-
mer slaves), in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPO-
RATION THEORY 85, 101-02 (Charles Fairman & Stanley Morrison eds., 1970).
264. Cf Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of
Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1322-24 (1991) (arguing that equal protec-
tion tests perpetuate rather than cure racial discrimination).
265. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2272-73 (1990) (describing instances of Supreme Court's mechanical approach to evaluat-
ing fundamental rights); Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old
Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 251 (1990) (expressing concern that Supreme Court
deals with fundamental rights in mechanical way); cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (accusing Court
of "sterile formalism" and stating formalism is wrong approach under Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which was designed to end such reasoning); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects
of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 409, 426 (1990) (stating that "[r]esponsible constitutional interpretation requires rec-
ognition of not only the particular words shared by different constitutional provisions but
also the historical and structural contexts of particular constitutional provisions").
266. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (noting that people can choose to learn English);
Commonwealth v. Olivo, 337 N.E.2d 904, 911 (Mass. 1975) (stating that English is language
of United States and that notice in English is therefore reasonable).
267. See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating, "[i]t is not
difficult for us to understand why the Secretary decided that forms should be printed and
oral instructions given in the English language: English is the national language of the
United States"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984); Pagan v. Dubois, 884 F. Supp. 25, 27-28
(D. Mass. 1995) (arguing that protection of language rights would endanger national
unity); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 836 (Cal. 1973) (offering several policy reasons,
including encouragement of immigrants to learn English, to support failure to provide no-
tice in Spanish), cert. denied sub nom. Guerrero v. Swoap, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974).
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part in many decisions denying services or benefits to language minori-
ties. In addition, they raise legitimate concerns about the effects of pro-
tecting language minorities or mandating accommodation of linguistic
difficulties.
Perhaps the most persistent objection to providing services and bene-
fits to language minorities is that placing such a duty on the government
will unavoidably burden already-strapped local and state treasuries.268
While making accommodations for one language, such as Spanish, may
often be feasible, opponents argue that the inevitable duty to accommo-
date all languages would be too difficult and expensive to accomplish.269
In cases where language minorities request notice or services in their own
languages, opponents contend that the expense of providing such services
would be an unjustified burden on state and local governments.2
Another difficulty presented by providing services or benefits to some
languages and not others is that new equal protection problems may be
created. 271 For example, implementation of the dicta in cases such as Yu
Cong Eng2 72 and Hernandez,273 which at least imply that the scrutiny
courts give language discrimination will depend on geographic con-
texts,274 could lead to the denial of services or benefits to those non-Eng-
lish speakers unfortunate enough to live in communities where they
constitute a small minority of the population or where there is no history
268. See Vialez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109,120 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(arguing that requirement of bilingual notice would unduly burden New York Housing
Authority); Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (stating that
identifying language as suspect classification would severely burden government), affd,
475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973); Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 838 (listing broad range of duties that
might be imposed by decisions protecting plaintiffs' putative right to notice in Spanish).
269. See Carmona, 325 F. Supp. at 1342 (arguing that requiring California to provide
services in Spanish would also require it to do so in all languages).
270. See id. (stating that accommodation of all languages in government operations
would be "all but impossible").
271. See Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 42 (stating that providing Spanish translation
based only on size of Latino population would violate equal protection rights of other
language minorities); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (arguing that
providing Civil Service examinations in one non-English language but not in others would
amount to "invidious discrimination"); cf. Alfonso v. Board of Review, 444 A.2d 1075,
1077 (N.J. 1982) (stating that problem of what languages should be provided translation is
best left to legislators), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806 (1982).
272. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
273. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
274. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (suggesting that context may be factor in deter-
mining how to review language discrimination cases); Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 524-25
(taking strength and history of Chinese community in Philippines into account in holding
that government could not forbid Chinese merchants from using Chinese characters in
their record keeping).
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:149
of discrimination against their national-origin group. Even Mr. Flores
could arguably fare poorly under this dicta. In 1990, Latinos comprised
only 5.9% of the population in Smith County, Texas, where he was ar-
rested, tried, and sentenced.27 5 If a non-English speaker from, say, Den-
mark, had been in Mr. Flores's position, some would argue that the
Hernandez dicta would afford him no protection.276
From another angle, some opponents of interpreting the Constitution
to accommodate language minorities would argue that extending such
protection to any language minority would, for various reasons, be funda-
mentally wrong.277 These opponents see efforts to accommodate lan-
guage minorities as unnecessarily benevolent treatment for individuals
who have failed or refused to learn the English language.278 While this
argument sometimes serves as a veneer to cover racist and isolationist
attitudes, 279 it is also propounded by advocates for minorities and, ac-
cording to some, by members of the minority groups themselves.28 °
Moreover, many of these opponents of bilingual education and other
accommodations for language minorities believe that such efforts under-
275. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., 1990 CENSUS
OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: TEXAS 31 (1992). Interest-
ingly, a full third of Smith County's Latino residents are recorded as not speaking English
"very well." Id., SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: TEXAS 715.
276. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (noting possibility that language of certain ethnic
groups may serve as surrogate for race in equal protection analysis).
277. See David J. Willis, Time We Draw the Line About Speaking English, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 29, 1995, at A39 (stating that if nation cannot preserve its culture by defend-
ing its language, then it is not really nation); cf. Frontera, 522 F.2d at 1220 (noting national
interest in English as common language).
278. See Miguel Bustillo, City Criticized for Printing Notices in Spanish Paper, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at B1 (describing citizen complaints that arose when municipality
awarded contract to publish legal notices to low-bidding Spanish-language newspaper);
Angie Cannon & Steven Thomma, Language Wars Tap Insecurity; Battle over English Has
Historical Basis for Americans, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 10, 1995, at 2 (reporting Congress-
man's proposal to abolish all federal mandates and funding for bilingual education).
279. See Kathryn K. Imahara & Ki Kim, English Only-Racism in Disguise: An Anal-
ysis of Dimaranan v. PVHMC, 23 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 107, 108-09 (1992) (linking ad-
vent of English-only proposals to anti-immigration movements); Kenneth L. Karst, Essay:
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 352 (1986)
(asserting that language differences provide both way to rationalize discrimination and
means of accomplishing it).
280. See Lawrence Grey, Editorial, English-Only Law Helps Minorities, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 1996, at 9A (arguing that inability to speak English hurts minorities);
Mauro E. Murica, Editorial, Official Language Movement Not Same As "English Only,"
PHOENIX GAZETrE, May 29,1993, at A15 (noting strong minority support for official Eng-
lish legislation). Contra Telephone Interview with Angela Acosta, Research Coordinator,
Southwest Voter Research Institute, Inc. (Sept. 12, 1996) (suggesting that Texas Hispanic
voters oppose English-only measures).
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mine the goal of full equality, because they encourage non-English speak-
ers to retain a discriminated-against trait of their ethnicity.28 1 As this
country's predominant language, English can be the key to employment,
adequate political representation, and fair treatment in a variety of con-
texts, from restaurants to courtrooms.282
These political and social ideological concerns are openly discussed in
many court decisions concerning language discrimination. 283 Although
the arguments can be persuasive, they can also be unimaginative and
poorly reasoned. Furthermore, they should not serve as the primary jus-
tification for the denial of constitutional rights. While the Constitution
has often required that we balance one group of rights against another, it
has never demanded the outright sacrifice of rights or benefits as impor-
tant as the elective franchise, education, or fair treatment in the criminal
courts, all of which are at risk for language minorities under law which
affords them little protection.
2. Rebutting the Argument for Language Discrimination
Reviewing language discrimination claims under the strict scrutiny ru-
bric would certainly and properly result in more successful claims against
state actions, and it would also result in greater state expense. However,
limits on such claims already exist; therefore, review should not interfere
with legitimate state action, nor should it burden the states beyond their
capabilities. 281 Indeed, the two-prong strict scrutiny test used to decide
Fourteenth Amendment issues should still permit necessary discrimina-
281. See Shannon A. Horst, Opinion, Why Americans, New and Old, Need English,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 12, 1989, at 19 (arguing that official-English policy
would guarantee more opportunities for language minorities); Language As Barrier, INDI-
ANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 12, 1995, at A12 (stating that "numerous" studies have discredited
bilingual education's ability to help children learn English).
282. See Ken Hamblin, Perspective, Bilingualism Fosters Racial Strife, DENY. POST,
Nov. 5, 1995, at E-03 (maintaining that English language inability isolates immigrants in
United States); Marshall Ingwerson, In Miami, Sharp Tongues Battle over Bilingualism,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 17, 1987, at 3 (citing University of Florida study that
showed Latino immigrants who cannot speak English lose 40% of their earning power).
283. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
284. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 138 n.3 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (stating that pre-
dicted "parade of horribles" would not result from removing language from allowable con-
siderations for sentencing); Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 842 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (stating that
"parade of horribles" is "no more than a retreat into the irrational"); cf. Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2333 (1990) (calling "slippery
slope" argument way to avoid making value judgments but also value judgment in itself, as
it prevents any government protection of fundamental liberties). In an interesting histori-
cal retort to the "slippery slope" argument, one court rejected the argument that providing
interpreters for non-English speaking jurors would lead to juries composed of many na-
tionalities, all requiring interpreters, by stating that "[e]xtremes prove nothing" because
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tion on the basis of language, if the government can present a compelling
purpose for its actions.285 This is a difficult standard to meet, as it should
be, but not impossible.286 A national emergency or public safety, for ex-
ample, may be sufficient goals. 287 However, the encouragement of non-
English speakers to learn English should not be an acceptable goal.288
While it may be more desirable and efficient to have a nation of multil-
inguals, 289 we must expect that we will always have among us monol-
"[s]uch complications are not likely to arise, where ample judicial discretion exists." Trini-
dad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65, 70-71 (Colo. 1879).
285. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
286. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885, 905 (1986) (acknowledging that even system recognizing right to lan-
guage should limit that right for some reasons, such as safety); cf Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (suggesting that, for equal protection cases involv-
ing affirmative action programs, strict scrutiny need not always be fatal). But see Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (asserting strict scrutiny in equal
protection realm is "fatal in fact"). The Court has accepted a compelling justification only
once. In Korematsu v. United States, Japanese-Americans protested World War II intern-
ment as violative of equal protection. 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). The Court, while identify-
ing race as a "suspect" classification, went on to accept the government's compelling
purpose for internment: national security. Id. at 218-19. This decision has been criticized
on several grounds. See id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (contradicting government's
contention of imminent danger from all persons of Japanese dissent and asserting equal
protection violation); David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Inno-
cent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790,
809-10 n.60 (1991) (stating that flaw in Korematsu was that Court ignored racist stereotype
implicit in government internment regulations); Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't
Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 375, 381 (1995) (noting evidence that government's justification in Korematsu was
illusory).
287. See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REV. 885, 902 (1986) (stating that where communication in one language is re-
quired, such as when safety is at issue, "limited official monolingualism" should be
acknowledged).
288. See Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Serv-
ices in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1360 (1987) (contending it is unlikely that man-
dated monolingualism is sufficiently compelling state interest); see also Bill 0. Hing,
Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of
Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863,
874 (1993) (claiming assimilation justification masks race-based motivations).
289. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (stating, "[p]erhaps it would be
highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot
be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution"); see also Bill Piatt, Toward
Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885, 899-900
(1986) (stating that rise in Spanish immigration and increased international business rela-
tionships are good reasons to encourage multilingualism); cf. Yniguez v. Arizonans for
Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating American tradition of accommo-
dation and tolerance are as important as goals of assimilation).
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inguals who do not speak the language of the majority.2 9 ° To use their
language handicap against them unnecessarily is fundamentally unfair.2 9 '
Additionally, meaningful application of the two-prong strict scrutiny
test should involve serious attention to the second prong: the relation-
ship between the permissible goal and the state response. In looking at
the fit between the purpose and the act, the Supreme Court in equal pro-
tection cases has allowed the states to discriminate on the basis of certain
traits, even when those traits are closely related to a group generally mer-
iting heightened scrutiny, as long as the traits are relevant to a legitimate
state goal.293 Traditionally, the Court has given such trait-based discrimi-
nation minimal scrutiny.294 However, when the trait is related intimately
to a suspect group, this potentially invidious relationship should warrant
290. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
FOR AMERICANS? 192 (1990) (stating that Americans have always had to confront reality
of large numbers of non-English speakers); Joshua A. Fishman, Language Maintenance in a
Supra-Ethnic Age: Summary and Conclusions (discussing language-maintenance efforts
among United States ethnic groups, including foreign-language presses, broadcasting, cul-
tural organizations, and "group schools"), in LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
392, 392-93, 1978.
291. See United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating,
"Particularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages are spoken is a callousness
to the crippling language handicap of a newcomer to this [sic] shores, whose life and free-
dom the state by its criminal processes chooses to put in jeopardy.") (quoting United
States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970); Martha Minow, Learn-
ing to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 159 (1985) (arguing that refusing to recognize language differences
results in aiding dominant group and hurting minority). Language intolerance also does
not speak well of a society that prides itself on tolerance. See William G. Ross, A Judicial
Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 167 n.238
(1988) (observing that in Meyer, petitioner argued that anti-German statutes mirrored
"Prussian theory of State," which gave state power to do whatever it deemed necessary
without regard to constitution).
292. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1972) (describ-
ing cases where Supreme Court strengthened ends/means test and overturned legislation
under rational basis review).
293. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (allowing peremptory challenge of Spanish-
speaking juror because of perceived inability "to defer to the official translation of Span-
ish-language testimony"); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (holding
discrimination on basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on basis of gender). But see City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 468-69 (1985) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (stating that traits may be relevant under some circumstances, but not relevant
under others).
294. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42 (stating that discrimination against mental re-
tardation requires only rational basis); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20 (holding that
discrimination on basis of pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination); see also Flores,
904 S.W.2d at 136 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (describing various levels of review used by
Supreme Court).
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strict scrutiny, 295 and the Court should then seriously review the rele-
vancy of the trait to the states' compelling purpose.29 6 Even though such
review would result in more successful equal protection claims, attention
to the relevancy of the classification to compelling state purposes could
also allow states more flexibility to meet urgent needs, if the courts bring
meaningful and considered interpretation to the constitutional standards
they apply.297 Of course, similar attention should also be given to the
relationship between ends and means in the realm of due process funda-
mental rights.
Significantly, although strict scrutiny should be the appropriate stan-
dard in cases of language discrimination, strict scrutiny analysis was not a
necessary predicate for a ruling in Mr. Flores's favor. In denying Mr.
Flores's claim, the court not only quickly disposed of the suspect classifi-
cation argument, 298 but also gave no meaningful consideration to the de-
fault standard-the minimal scrutiny, rational basis test.299 This test
requires at least that the state's chosen means be rationally related to its
goal.3"' 'Rationally related' must mean more than 'merely conceivable';
otherwise, any stated reason would suffice. 10 However, the court gave
295. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 136 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (noting close relation-
ship between language and race or national origin); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices:
The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761,763-64
& n.8 (observing that some traits are "super-correlated" to suspect classifications and may
deserve special scrutiny).
296. Cf Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that even ration-
ality review should pay attention to relevance of class to valid state goal).
297. See id. at 453 (noting attention to relevancy of trait to state goal will result in
"differing results" for classification based on alienage, gender, or illegitimacy, rather than
in automatic validation or invalidation for other classifications).
298. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130 (asserting that, for purposes of suspect classifica-
tions, language fluency is not equivalent to race or national origin).
299. See id. at 131 (finding, in two sentences, legitimate state interest in sentencing
adequate to support denial of probation on basis of language).
300. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 130-31; see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976) (finding age classification rationally related to goal of
prepared police force).
301. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that rational-basis
review should examine legitimacy and neutrality of state goal); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Sepa-
rating Prejudice from Rationality in Equal Protection Cases: A Legacy of Thurgood Mar-
shall, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 98 (1994) (noting that literal reading of rational-basis test
required little more than "minimal sanity" by legislature in enacting measure); see also
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (asserting that discriminatory zoning law is unconstitutional
under rational-basis review); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (calling state law
discrimination on basis of residency unconstitutional under minimal scrutiny test). It is not
clear whether this more stringent rationality review is really rationality review or, perhaps,
a version of intermediate scrutiny. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 459 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissent-
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no serious attention to the fit between the court's stated goal and its cho-
sen means.30 2 The purported rationale for the decision to deny Mr. Flo-
res probation was that meaningful rehabilitation could not be
achieved.3" 3 However, meaningful rehabilitation is no more achieved by
a year's incarceration than by classes in a language one does not under-
stand.3" 4 The denial of rehabilitation is not the same as meaningful reha-
bilitation, and a year in jail might even contravene this goal.
Furthermore, if the judge's reason for not providing an interpreter for
Mr. Flores was economic, then the judge should have given some consid-
eration to the relative expense of a year's incarceration in comparison to
provision of an interpreter for an alcohol rehabilitation program. 30 5
VII. CONCLUSION
While a mechanical interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment can
produce the Flores decision and decisions like it, more thoughtful inter-
pretations are available. As a member of a monolingual language minor-
ity, Mr. Flores faced a combination of difficulties. First, because he was a
member of a group that was not identical to one based on race or na-
tional origin, he could not claim suspect classification for equal protection
purposes. Second, because the trial judge denied Mr. Flores a state privi-
lege rather than a fundamental right, he could not complain of the denial
under a due process theory. But however blindingly logical these two
analyses appear, their result is that a group comprised only of national
origin minorities may be discriminated against and arbitrarily denied
state privileges on the basis of language.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari for the Flores case, thus
foreclosing for now the consideration these issues deserve. However, had
the Court reviewed the case,-and, in light of current English-only drives
and animosity toward immigrants, it should have-the Court could have
ing) (stating that cases invalidating legislation under "rational review" are better seen as
applying intermediate-level review).
302. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 138 (Overstreet, J., dissenting) (noting that county pro-
vision of interpreter would have satisfied court's stated goal of meaningful rehabilitation).
303. Id. at 131.
304. See James Harrington, Language Barrier Doesn't Merit Jail Time, DATLLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Aug. 7, 1995, at A9 (arguing that requiring Mr. Flores to take English class
would have made more sense).
305. See id. (noting that Flores decision increased burden on taxpayers rather than
lessened it). The cost to maintain a prisoner for a year in a Texas prison is $17,000 per
year. Robert Stanton, Don't Drop Out: Neighborhood, Other Groups Make Students
Their Business, Hous. POST, May 21, 1994, at A21. Texas provides for the payment of
interpreters to fall between $15 and $100 per day, at the court's discretion. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.30(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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demonstrated that Fourteenth Amendment analysis can be more flexible
than the mathematical formula the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ap-
plied. The Court could have reached a different result by declaring lan-
guage-based discrimination to be suspect, either because language is
presumptively related to national origin, or because it is often, by itself,
the basis of invidious discrimination. Further, the Court could have re-
lied on the ethnic and linguistic makeup of Texas to reach this conclusion,
pointing to the historical discrimination against Spanish-speaking citizens
in the state. Finally, the Court also could have eschewed the race/lan-
guage nexus requirement, thus effecting the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is to protect the rights of politically powerless
minorities.
Alternatively, the Court could have taken seriously the rational-basis
test mechanically relied upon to deny Mr. Flores's claim. Even minimal
scrutiny merited an examination of the fit between denying Mr. Flores's
probation request and the stated goal of meaningful rehabilitation. Addi-
tionally, even if the trial judge had been motivated by economic concerns,
the decision to deny Mr. Flores probation defies rationality.
Furthermore, the Court could have taken the bold step of asserting
that a state actor must mete out fair treatment to language minorities in
the criminal justice system. Were the Court to make such a bold asser-
tion, it would be finding a liberty interest in the decision of whether or
not to grant probation. Such an interest could not, of course, guarantee
probation, but it would ensure that offenders like Mr. Washington, who
lost his chance at probation for failing to speak the magic words ("yes,
sir"), and Mr. Flores, who lost his chance for failing to speak the right
language, would receive serious and rational review of their probation
requests.
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